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( ABSTRACT 
In 1990 the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA 
'90) became law (P.L. 101-508). Language in this statute 
requires that drug manufacturers provide rebates to each 
state Medicaid program (See Appendix 3) for prescription 
drugs purchased through the program. Rebates are calculated 
by a formula, but in general are written to reduce drug 
acquisition costs of 15% below wholesale acquisition cost, 
that is, 15% below the prices paid by wholesalers to the 
manufacturers for drugs distributed to the retail class of 
trade. These discounts only apply to the prescription drug 
coverage portion of the Medicaid 1 program. Though intended 
to secure low prices for prescription drugs purchased 
through the federal Medicaid program, it was hypothesized as 
a basis for this project that OBRA '90 mandated discounts 
would result in a cost shifting and increased prices paid by 
other market segments, and, that by reducing manufacturer 
profits, would reduce funding for manufacturer sponsored 
pharmaceutical research. 
To explore these hypotheses a population was defined 
and a structured, closed end, opinion questionnaire was 
devised. A list of qualified bidders for the State of Rhode 
Island annual drug bids was selected. This list comprised 
an entire universe of manufacturers who are involved in 
competitive bidding on the state contracts. The list of 89 
vendors, though small in absolute terms, does cover the 
ii 
( available pharmaceutical market as defined by the needs of 
those patients served by various facilities associated with 
the State of Rhode Island. 
Respondents at central bid addresses were asked to 
complete anonymous questionnaires. Questionnaire design 
concentrated on brevity, ease of answer, and on not inducing 
bias. The only incentive offered to completing the 
questionnaire was a copy of the results. 
It was found that opinions expressed in the 
questionnaire supported the hypothesis that OBRA '90 would 
add upward pressure to drug prices in general. Responses 
suggest that OBRA '90 will have the effect of decreasing 
manufacturer profit, increasing costs to buyers other than 
Medicaid, and decreasing respondents ability to offer low 
prices in competitive bids for both innovator and generic 
drugs. Within study limitations, modest support was found 
for the hypothesis that lower manufacturer profits meant 
less funding for research. 
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PREFACE 
In the Spring of 1990, Senator David Pryor sponsored 
the "Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act" and 
the Medicaid Anti-discriminatory Drug Act." In the House of 
Representatives, Ron Wyden and Jim Cooper sponsored the 
"Medicaid Prescription Drug Fair Access and Pricing Act". 
These measures contain some provisions designed to secure 
for Medicaid some of the discounts on prescription drugs 
available to other buyers. Significant portions of these 
three bills were incorporated into the "Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990" (OBRA '90). On November 5, 
1990, OBRA '90 was signed into law. 2 
Anecdotally, there exists a wide disparity in 
pharmaceutical pricing offered to the various groups of 
purchasers considered in this questionnaire. Historically, 
the Veterans Administration depot pricing has been reputed 
to be the recipient of the lowest prices and the price paid 
by the independent pharmacy the highest, while all the other 
groups have fallen somewhere in between. While the 
pharmaceutical buyer for the State of Rhode Island, an 
attempt was made to obtain a list of prices offered to the 
Veterans Administration to use as a benchmark in gauging the 
success of Rhode Island's procurement efforts. No one 
reached at the Veterans Administration would agree to 
provide these data. 
While not supported by specific data, it is a long-
vi 
( standing complaint among pharmacists that large price 
disparities in drug purchasing exist. As an extreme 
example, at one time the General Hospital, State of Rhode 
Island, was paying one cent each for nitroglycerine patches 
while the Average Wholesale Price3 to pharmacies in the same 
community was one dollar each. 4 In 1990, primarily due to 
Senator David Pryor, the U.S. Senate became aware that while 
one U.S. Government agency, the Veterans Administration, was 
buying pharmaceuticals at bargain prices, another branch of 
Government, the Health Care Financing Administration for 
Medicaid, was paying approximately the same price as retail 
pharmacies, i.e., the highest. 5 The Senate, in an effort to 
reduce the dollar outlay for Medicaid patients, included 
certain provisions in OBRA '90 aimed at reducing the prices 
of drugs to Medicaid. 
Language provisions pertinent to this thesis mandate an 
increasing schedule of rebates (Appendix 3) that will be 
returned to the Medicaid Program by the manufacturers. The 
Act benefits only the Medicaid .Program expenditures and does 
not address other markets. 
The goal of this research is to explore the effect of 
OBRA '90 mandated rebates on purchasers other than Medicaid 
by sending a brief questionnaire to companies active in the 
annual State of Rhode Island pharmaceutical bid. The 
questionnaire was sent to the central bid addresses of all 
vendors on the State of Rhode Island pharmaceutical bid 
vii 
( list. 
The questionnaire was composed of 12 questions and four 
additional classification questions. The classification 
questions were designed to identify the type of business of 
the respondents. Classification separated "brand name, 
innovator" manufacturers from generic manufacturers and 
"other" businesses. Classification was necessary because 
OBRA '90 mandates different rebate treatments between 
generic and innovator manufacturers. Because 
nonmanufacturers were not specifically addressed by OBRA 
'90, they will be impacted differently, possibly only 
peripherally. Classification, then, allowed assessment of 
respondents market position when considering their answers. 
Responses were analyzed to study bidders opinions on 
the impact of OBRA '90 on their activities. Questions were 
designed to explore certain possible areas of OBRA '90 
impact thought to be relevant to their daily business 
routine, that is, the sale of pharmaceuticals, and, 
particularly, sales by competitive bidding. Essentially, 
the information sought was: What will be the effect on drug 
prices in market segments other than Medicaid? Will 
mandated discounts be a disincentive to manufacturers to 
provide special pricing to buying groups and institutions? 
If profit margins are reduced, will funding for new drug 
research decline? 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT. • • . . . . • . • • • • • . • . • • • • . • . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . • . • • . . . . . ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . • . • . . iv 
DEDICATION. . • . • . . . . . . • . • . • . • • • . • • • • • • . . . . • . . . . . • • • • • . . . . . v 
PREFACE •....•.••.•••.....•.......•.••.•..........••....•. vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. • • . • • . . • . • • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • ix 
LIST OF TABLES. . . • • • . . . • . . . • • • . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . x 
LIST OF FIGURES. • • • • • • . • • • . . • • . . • • • . . . • • . • • . . . . . . • . • • • . . . xi 
ISSUES/HYPOTHESES. • . . . • • • • . . • • . • . • • . . . . • • • . • . • • . . . • . . . • . . 1 
METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . • . • . • • . . . . . . . • . . . • • • • . • • • • • . . . . . . . . . • • 6 
RESULTS/DISCUSSION ••.••••••.•••..•.••••••••••••••.••••••• 20 
CONCLUSION. • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 89 
APPENDIX ONE ••••....••••••••••.•••.•••••••.••••••.•••.••• 97 
APPENDIX TWO. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 8 
APPENDIX THREE ....•••••••.•.•..•.••••••••••••••••••..•.•• 101 
APPENDIX FOUR ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••.••••.• 103 
APPENDIX FIVE ••••.••..•.•.............••••......•..•..••• 105 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .•.•••••••••.•..•••.•••••.•.•••.•...••••..... 113 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE ONE ..•.........••.•.•••..•......••••••.•••..•...••• 24 
Results of question one 
TABLE TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . . • . . • • • • . . . 2 6 
Results of question two 
TABLE THREE •••••.•••.•.•••.••..•••.....•.........••••..•• 30 
Results of question three 
TABLE FOUR .....•.....••............•.•.••..•.•.••••..••.. 36 
Results of question four 
TABLE FIVE. . . . . . . • • . . . • • . . • • . . . • • . . . • • . . • • • . • . . • . • . • • • • • • 41 
Results of question five 
TABLE SIX •...•.••••.•.••.•.•••••••..•...•••••...•••...••• 47 
Results of question six 
TABLE SEVEN •.••.•••••. , . . . . • • • • • • • . . • • • • • . • . • • • • • • . • . • • • • 53 
Results of question seven 
TABLE EIGHT. • • • • • • . . • • • . . . • • . . . • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • 59 
Results of question eight 
TABLE NINE. . . • • • • • . . • . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . • • • • • . • • . • • 64 
Results of question nine 
TABLE TEN. . • . • . • . • . . • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • 6 9 
Results of question ten 
TABLE ELEVEN. • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . . • • • • • . • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • 7 6 
Results of question eleven 
TABLE TWELVE •..•.•.••••..••..•••••..••.•...•.•••••.•••.•• 83 
Results of question twelve 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
CHART THIRTEEN ........................................... 21 
Classification of respondents 
CHART ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 
Familiarity with OBRA '90 rebates 
CHART TWO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
Respondents currently participating 
CHART THREE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 
How likely are respondents to continue 
participation in the OBRA '90 Medicaid 
rebates? 
CHART FOUR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 
Respondents predicted the effect of rebates 
on gross profit. 
CHART FIVE ............................................... 40 
Which strategies did respondents feel were 
most likely to be used by their company to 
recover lost profits, if any. 
CHART SIX ................................................ 46 
Respondents were asked if the Medicaid 
rebates have increased costs to buyers. 
CHART SEVEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Respondents were asked which buyers 
receive their company's lowest price. 
CHART EIGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Respondents were asked if the OBRA '90 
legislation has provided an incentive 
to charge all buyers the same price. 
CHART NINE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3 
Respondents were asked if their company 
will publish the Medicaid "best price" 
in a generally available forum. 
xi 
CHART TEN. • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . . . • • • . • • • • . . . . • • • • . • • . . . . • • • • 6 8 
Respondents were asked if their ability 
to price (low) or innovator drugs will 
be affected by the Medicaid rebates. 
CHART ELEVEN. • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . . . . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 7 5 
Respondents were asked if their ability 
to price (low) on generic drugs will 
be affected by the Medicaid rebates. 
CHART TWELVE ••••••.••••..••..•••...••••••••••••••••..•••• 82 
Respondents were asked if exemption from 
the OBRA '90 "best price" mechanism would 
allow a bidder to receive a lower price. 
xii 
( ISSUES AND HYPOTHESES 
ISSUES: 
The passage of the OBRA '90 budget legislation included 
provisions designed to reduce the cost of prescription 
medication to Medicaid (see also, Introduction). The Act 
mandates that rebates (Appendix 3) shall be made to Medicaid 
ultimately amounting to as much as 15% of the "Average 
Manufacturers Price" (AMP). AMP is "the average price paid 
by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail class of 
trade." Should a manufacturer offer "any buyer" a lower 
price than can be had with the rebate schedule, the Act 
requires that Medicaid receive additional rebates to equal 
that lower price. This is referred to as the "best price" 
and is defined by OBRA '90 as ". the lowest price paid 
by any purchaser (exclusive of depot prices and single award 
contract prices as defined by an federal agency) 
· exclusive of nominal prices." 
In the literature reviewed, the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebates appear to be unprecedented. In effect, the 
federal government has dictated pricing methods to private 
manufacturers where previously pricing had been dictated by 
market considerations. While evidence is available that 
various groups have been able to negotiate prices in the 
past, this has been through bargaining power: 
"The characteristic of competitive market conditions 
was found to significantly influence lowering of prices 
offered to purchasing groups."6 
1 
( Also it is known that prices do vary: 
" . a major limitation of earlier drug pricing 
studies was that the data were obtained from published 
price lists, which do not reflect the actual prices 
paid. This finding is similar to the conclusion 
reached by Stigler and Kindhl on the basis of their 
study of several industrial markets. They found that 
published price lists tend to be rigid and do not 
accurately reflect the behavior of actual transaction 
prices. For nationally sold products, actual 
transaction prices tend to be lower and display a mu7h 
more flexible behavior pattern than catalog prices." 
The OBRA '90 rebates caused much speculation that a 
cost shifting would be felt by non-Medicaid purchasers, as 
manufacturers conceivably sought to recapture lost profit 
margin: 
"Pharmaceutical manufacturers are said to be raising 
prices to other purchasers, including other government 
agencies, So recover the discounts being offered to 
Medicaid." 
Indeed, almost as soon as OBRA '90 was passed, concerns 
about price increases to non-Medicaid purchasers began to 
appear in the media. The September, 1990, issue of The 
Consultant Pharmacist warned. 
" . economic realities suggest there is a strong 
likelihood that major manufacturers will shift costs to 
private payers as a 9esult of the proposal's 
implementation. . . " 
And, as early as January 14, 1991, Senator David Pryor is 
reported as writing that there are: 
" numerous confirmed reports that some drug 
manufacturers are in the process of reducing discounts 
... breaking long-term contracts, ~fid refusing to 
negotiate in good faith over price." 
While there was much conjecture about OBRA '90's effect 
on pricing, the literature search uncovered no systematic 
research on the topic except for an informal anecdotal 
2 
survey conducted by the American Society of Hospital 
Pharmacists that, 
" according to ASHP (American Society of Hospital 
Pharmacists) (their survey) . confirms what 
it predicted last year, that the law would have the 
unintended effect of raising drug cosrf to hospitals, 
HMO's, and community health centers." 
While the most numerous objections found were from the 
ranks of various pharmaceutical market segments, the 
objections of pharmaceutical manufacturers were also in 
evidence. These generally predicted loss of research monies 
available to develop new pharmaceuticals. Such as: 
" . insurers attempts to contain health care costs 
by controlling pharmaceutical expenditures may decrease 
incentives to pursue innovation in drug development, 
and discoura~Z investment in pharmaceutical 
R & D ••• II 
And this, from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association: 
"The research-based pharmaceutical industry invests 17 
percent of sales in R & D . . this commitment to 
research will result in future breakthrough drugs . 
the proposals advanced by Senator David Pryor woy~d 
clearly dampen the incentives to innovate . " 
Problem: 
That the federal government should mandate prices and 
rebates from private manufacturers is a significant 
departure from the usual sense of a free market economy, 
where prices are based on competition. As such, one wonders 
about the impact of OBRA '90 on a highly competitive 
procedure such as the bid process. Sentiments reported in 
the media (above) predicted that forced rebates to one 
particular market segment, Medicaid, would affect the prices 
3 
available to other purchasers. The issues are: 
The existence of the "best price" language may limit 
manufacturers' ability to offer any buyer a lower price 
than Medicaid. 
Buyers, such as institutions and other competitive 
bidders, who previously obtained deep discount may be 
unable to maintain them as manufacturers seek to avoid 
the additional "best price" rebates such discounts 
would trigger. 
On the manufacturing side, rebates may reduce profits 
which some have said may lead to a reduction in 
research funding for new drug products. 
HYPOTHESES: 
This work seeks to explore the impact of OBRA '90 
rebates on pharmaceutical pricing and particularly its 
effect on competitive bidding for pharmaceuticals in Rhode 
Island. An anonymous mail questionnaire (see Methodology, 
Exhibits) was developed to solicit opinion from business 
insiders (see Methodology) regarding OBRA '90's effects. 
Responses were analyzed to sustain or refute the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypotheses: 
Hl. That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode 
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebate requirements. 
H2. That most manufacturers are participating in the 
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
H3. That most manufacturers will continue to 
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one 
year). 
H4. That a majority of manufacturers will expect to 
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing 
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan. 
4 
( HS. That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will be · perceived as 
causing a reduction in funds available to support 
research. 
H6. That the following effects will occur in drug bid 
acquisitions: 
H6a: That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one 
segment of the pharmaceutical market will have the 
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence on 
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid. 
H6b: That all purchasers do not necessarily pay 
the same price for pharmaceuticals. 
H6c: That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers 
to receive the same price. 
H6d: That while a "best price" will be known and 
established in order to calculate the Medicaid 
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally 
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool 
or benchmark against which they might judge the 
success of their acquisitions. 
H6e: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
H6f: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
H6g: That if a competitive procurement group's 
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt 
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be 
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate 




Development of the Questionnaire: 
A copy of the legislation was obtained and reviewed. 
Based on this and preliminary literature research, 
questions were developed, refined and formatted into a 
survey. 
Survey Design: 
A structured, undisguised survey design was chosen for 
ease of tabulation. Survey scale was selected as a five 
point scale. This allowed respondents to select a "degree" 
of response instead of simply an affirmative, negative or 
"don't know." As percentages were to be calculated on the 
basis of total surveys returned this effectively 
proportioned "no answer" responses among the fixed 
alternatives. Therefore, "no answer" responses would be 
· tabulated and reported separately so that they could be 
"distributed by the reader," if desired, which more 
completely disclosed the results. Structured items on the 
questionnaire were precoded for ease of tabulation. The 
necessity of quoting the actual wording used in the OBRA '90 
regulations for the sake of clarity caused some questions to 
be lengthy. Since three pages was the practical limit to 
the questionnaire because of postage considerations and the 
desire to improve response by making the survey as brief as 
6 
( possible, the number of questions included was sixteen. 
These were composed of twelve research questions and four 
classification questions, an optional job description 
question and a suitable space for respondent's address, 
should he/she request a copy of the results. 
Of the research questions, questions one through three 
were designed to ease respondents into the subject matter. 
These questions are easy to answer and nonthreatening; 
sensitive issues are best reserved for later in the work. 14 
These questions also e a blish that the respondent is 
knowledgeable in the area being studied and that OBRA '90 
mandated rebates will have some effect on his/her company in 
the near term. Questions four and five explore the 
financial impact of OBRA '90 on respondents' firm. Question 
number seven attempts to establish that different purchasers 
receive different prices for pharmaceuticals while question 
number eight asks if the OBRA '90 regulations will encourage 
·their company to charge all purchasers the same price. 
Question number nine asks if respondents will publish the 
"best price" as defined by OBRA '90 in a generally available 
location. Questions ten, eleven and twelve explore 
respondents' opinion of the impact of OBRA '90 on special 
pricing their companies make available to competitive 
procurement groups. 
The classification questions, thirteen through sixteen, 
were included to determine the type of business of 
respondent. This was needed because OBRA '90 mandated 
7 
rebates were written to affect manufacturers and among 
manufacturers the law treats innovator and generic 
manufacturers differently. Thus, the type of respondent's 
business was useful in evaluating their response. 
One unnumbered open-ended question was included on a 
strictly optional basis asking respondents for their job 
title. Answers were wanted to establish that no particular 
position was overly represented, for instance, that 
responses were not limited to presidents of corporations 
(see results). Because it was felt more important to 
maximize response to the questionnaire by preserving 
anonymity, the question was made optional. 
It was hoped that copies of results offered to an 
audience that had a significant interest in this topic might 
act as incentive to increase participation and accuracy of 
results. In theory, those that wished to view the results 
would exercise more care in filling out the questionnaire as 
well as respond in a more timely fashion. Special effort 
was taken to promise confidentiality to participants so that 
responses would be unguarded and anonymity protecting 
against possible job conflict. Further, confidentiality was 
ensured by using an "unkeyed" questionnaire and the promise 
of no hidden identifiers to the recipients. This 
necessitated assigning key numbers to all returns before 
tabulation. 
Several staff members of the Department of Pharmacy 
Practice were chosen as a pretest audience for the 
8 
r questionnaire. While this might seem a biased testing 
group, this selection was needed because the subject matter 
of the questionnaire requires some understanding of the 
pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical procurement and 
topics relevant to it. 
Population Sampled: 
A duplicate of the current bid list for the State of 
Rhode Island annual sealed drug bids was obtained. This 
list was selected because ~t is composed of vendors known to 
be active in bid acquisitions in Rhode Island. It has been 
updated to reflect recent takeovers and mergers within the 
drug industry. This list is excellent for this research 
application because it will direct surveys to those central 
addresses where bid/contract decisions are actually made. At 
these locations the cover letter was addressed to the 
Director of Professional Relations. In the event that the 
addressee felt unable or unqualified to answer, it was 
requested that the survey be forwarded to an individual with 
the appropriate authority and expertise who would answer. 
Individuals at these addresses are able to extend 
special competitive pricing to, and enter into binding 
contracts with, pharmaceutical buyers. It can be reasoned 
that individuals empowered to set prices for a given 
corporation occupy responsible positions within that 
corporation and may be considered "key man" individuals. As 
such, they would have at least the required inside knowledge 
9 
to field any technical questions of the general nature posed 
by this questionnaire regarding profits and policies. In 
addition, the questionnaire was carefully designed not to 
require highly specific sensitive data about pricing and 
profits that might be restricted to those at the highest 
corporate levels only. 
While it may be argued that bias is introduced by this 
list, it is instead the most appropriate list to the 
research as it consists of manufacturers who actively bid on 
drug contracts and the focus of this research is the impact 
of the OBRA '90 legislation on this type of procurement. 
Furthermore, the list contains only 89 vendors, and is, 
therefore, of convenient size while comprising the entire 
universe of bidders on these Rhode Island pharmaceutical 
contracts. Selection of this list also eliminates the need 
to select a suitable sample size as the entire universe can 
be polled. 
Non-Response Bias: 
A Response Rate of 28/89, or 31% was achieved. No 
statistical adjustment was made for nonresponse. As with 
all surveys the possibility of bias caused by nonresponse, 
failure to obtain information from some elements of the 
population that were selected and designated for the sample, 
must be acknowledged. Regrettably, available resources 
allowed only one wave of questionnaire distribution and a 
single follow-up and no monetary incentive. Also, callbacks 
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were not possible because of the anonymous nature of the 
questionnaire. No attempt was made to adjust for 
nonresponse bias in the small population sampled; rather, 
efforts centered on minimizing possible bias by maximizing 
response. 
It was possible to employ two strategies 15 to reduce 
nonresponse: general methods designed to increase initial 
response rate and a follow-up letter to obtain additional 
respo nse. Steps to maximize initial response used were: 
- an "appeal" for response in a carefully composed 
cover letter; 
- the promise of anonymity; 
- questions designed not to probe sensitive areas 
because, "non response tends to increase with i:ge 
sensitivity of the information being sought."; 
- questions designed not to require such technical or 
specialized knowledge as only a few respondents might 
possess; 
the promise and appearance of brevity in 
questionnaire design; 
- the offer of a copy of the results to respondents; 
- "don't know" and no answers reported separately 
because they " can be treated as separate 
categories when reporting the results 17 .. in many 
ways this is the best strategy ... " 
While every effort was made to maximize response by 
incorporating basic tenets of questionnaire and cover letter 
design, some nonresponse bias must be assumed in any survey. 
Nonresponse bias may be mitigated somewhat in this work 
because an entire universe was sampled and the population 
selected was not a random population. The more 
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homogeneous the sample (i.e., the fewer conceivable 
subgroups it contains) the less the need for a high 
18 percentage of response. The sampling frame composed the 
entire list of bidders on the State of Rhode Island 
Pharmaceutical Bids. Bidders on this list must submit an 
acceptable qualification questionnaire to the Division of 
Purchasing before inclusion. Thus, it can be argued, that 
nonresponders are less likely to differ from responders than 
if the questionnaire was sent to a more random population. 
Timeframe: 
A first mailing was sent out on June 1, 1992. A 
follow - up letter was sent out on June 4, 1992. Keyed 
questionnaires contain hidden codes of various types that 
allow researchers to know which addressee has responded. 
Because this survey was unkeyed to guarantee anonymity, the 
follow-up letter was sent to the entire universe and took the 
caution of expressing appreciation in case the recipient had 
already answered. As it is customary to receive 90% of all 
responses within three weeks, 19 this survey was closed on 
June 30, 1992. 
Selection of Respondent Groups: 
Classification questions at the end of the survey allow 
the responses to be grouped among nonmanufacturers, 
manufacturers of innovator prescription drugs and 
manufacturers of generic drugs. An open ended job 
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classification section was included to ensure that 
responders represented a broad group of individuals and that 
no one group was overly represented. For reasons of 
confidentiality, this section was indicated as "strictly 
optional." It was considered more important to do 
everything possible to maximize response by not compromising 
anonymity than to have 100% response to this question. 
Sixteen of twenty-eight respondents chose to answer the 
optional classification question. Responses were broken 
down as follows: 
Sales or Marketing Manager ............. : ..... 2 
Contract Manager ............................. 1 
Vice President ............................... 2 
Manager (unspecified) ........................ 4 
Director of Professional Relations, 
Information, Public Information, 
Liaison, etc ................................. 3 
Marketing Staff .............................. 1 
President .................................... 1 
Director (unspecified) ....................... 1 
Medicaid Rebate Analyst ...................... 1 
No Answer ................................... 12 
Survey Returns: 
Returns were collected in the Department of Pharmacy 
Practice, Fogarty Hall, University of Rhode Island. A count 
of envelopes returned per day was kept for reference. 
Returns were then placed in large envelopes separated by day 
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of receipt and held for analysis. 
There were no "undeliverable" returned by the Post 
Office. This reflects well on the accuracy and currency of 
the list selected. One envelope was received in error: it 
was a return to another survey. Apart from that there were 
four surveys considered unusable because respondents 
indicated they were unfamiliar with OBRA '90 rebates, there 
were no blank returns and no refusals. 
Envelopes were opened carefully by hand. Each envelope 
and survey was then keyed alike. Keying ensures that recon-
struction of respondents complete package is available 
should the editing procedure raise any questions that need 
to be answered. It also preserved data in useable form 
should it need revisiting for any purpose. This keying was 
necessary as the survey was conducted with a promise of 
strict dentiality. Respondents were promised no hidden 
identifiers were included, as in fact, none were. So keying 
had to be accomplished as a separate process after return. 
At this time postmarks appearing on the envelopes were 
recorded on the corresponding survey. Collecting these 
postmarks, then, was an exercise in proper procedure and to 
verify that the location of responders was not limited to 
any particular region or locale. Variety of postmarks was 
satisfactory. However, the U.S. Post Office did not post 
mark all envelopes. While postmarks have some uses in mail 
surveys, none will be made for the purpose of this analysis 
for reasons of confidentiality. 
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The completed questionnaires were then edited to 
improve the accuracy and clarity of answers and help elimi-
nate inconsistencies and obvious wrong or ambiguous replies. 
For instance, if a respondent in an auto owners survey 
answers that he does not have a car but then in subsequent 
questions goes on to describe its color, insurance, number 
of miles driven, monthly payment, pride of ownership, etc., 
then a researcher can justify recording the respondent as an 
owner. In this case the editor would reason that respondent 
checked "do not own car" by error because that answer would 
be inconsistent with data collected in following questions. 
This editing reduces any imperfections to a minimum and 
ensures the fullest possible use of the survey returns. As 
the questionnaires returned were very well completed the 
amount of editing required was negligible. 
Hypotheses: 
The research attempted to explore the following 
hypotheses: 
Hl. That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode 
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebate requirements. 
H2. That most manufacturers are participating in the 
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
H3. That most manufacturers will continue to 
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one 
year). 
H4. That a majority of manufacturers will expect to 
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing 
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan. 
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HS. That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will be perceived as 
causing a reduction in funds available to support 
research. 
H6. That the following effects will occur in drug bid 
acquisitions: 
Analysis: 
H6a: That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one 
segment of the pharmaceutical market are likely to 
have the effect of exerting an upward influence on 
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid. 
H6b: That all purchasers do not necessarily pay 
the same price for pharmaceuticals. 
H6c: That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers 
to receive the same price. 
H6d: That while a "best price" will be known and 
established in order to calculate the Medicaid 
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally 
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool 
or benchmark against which they might judge the 
success of their acquisitions. 
H6e: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
H6f: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
H6g: That if a competitive procurement group's 
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt 
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be 
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate 
calculations, this will result in lower prices 
being offered. 
Respondents were classified according to their answers 
to classification questions thirteen through sixteen. Then, 
questionnaire responses were tabulated by taking the total 
number of responses for each fixed alternative for each 
question. Responses were then cross-tabulated by respondent 
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group as each identified themselves in the classification 
questions. Finally, responses were cross-tabulated both as 
a percentage within class and as a total response among all 
classifications in order to provide an overall sense of 
response to each question. Results are reported later in 
this work. 
Statistical Tests: 
Regrettably, testing must be done in the aggregate, as 
response was not sufficient to test the cross tabs. 
There are two statistical tests appropriate to this 
work; they are the Binomial Sign Test of a proportion and 
the Chi Square "goodness of fit" test. These tests are 
appropriate to these data characteristics of small sample 
size, nonrandom population and discrete values. These tests 
are robust, distribution free nonparametric tests, as such, 
it is not necessary to assume a normal distribution of the 
sample population. 
The Binomial Test: 
The binomial formula: 
(n) x n-x 
p(x) = (x) p (1-p) 
is used where p (probability) = .5, indicating a random 
binomial distribution, and n = trials and a significance 
level, alpha, as close as possible to .05 is used to test 
the hypothesis. Because the binomial distribution is a 
discrete, noncontinuous distribution, a rejection region is 
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found giving the significance level closest to .OS (S% 
significance level). If the value of the test statistic 
falls in the rejection region the Null Hypothesis is 
rejected, the Alternate Hypothesis is accepted and, 
therefore, statistical significance is accepted. 
Null Hypothesis: The distribution of responses observed is 
a random distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: A statistically significant 
preference is exhibited by the responses. 
Chi Square "goodness of fit " Test: 
This test requires two assumptions: 
1. All expected frequencies are at least one. 
2. At most, 20% of the expected frequencies are less 
than S. 
Formula: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O - E)(O-E)/E 
Where O represents the observed frequency and E represents 
the expected frequency. Expected frequency is calculated. 
Expected Frequency = np 
where n is the number of trials and p is the probability for 
the category and at a S% significance level (alpha = .OS) · 
and degrees of freedom (df) = k - 1 where k is the number of 
categories. Using the df at alpha = .OS a critical value is 
obtained. If the value of the test statistic calculated 
(Chi Square) is less than the critical value, do not reject 
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the Null Hypothesis. If Chi Square is greater than the 
value of the test statistic, accept the Alternate 
Hypothesis. 
Null Hypothesis: The distribution of responses is random. 
Alternative Hypothesis: A statistically significant 
preference is exhibited by the responses. 
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( RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Classification: 
Respondents were classified in three categories 
according to their answers to questions 13, 14 15 and 16. 
For the purposes of this research the categories were 
defined as follows: 
Innovator Manufacturer: a company that manufactures or 
markets a prescription drug whose original patent rights are 
still in force. Such a drug may not be manufactured without 
permission of the patent holder by submission to the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) of a proper Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (ANDA). 
Generic Manufacturer: a company that manufactures generic 
drugs but does not presently manufacture or market any 
innovator drugs. 
Generic Drug: multi-source drugs whose exclusive 
patent rights have expired and with proper application 
to the FDA may be made by various pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. Also called "noninnovator multiple 
source drugs". 
"Other": Companies qualified on the bid list but 
identifying themselves through classification questions as 
not being manufacturers. Possible examples include 
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Results of Classification of Respondents: 
innovator manufacturers: 15 





For the purposes of this research, respondents were 
classified as innovator manufacturers if they responded to 
classification questions by indicating that they were 
manufacturers who marketed at least one drug protected by 
exclusive patent either through their own discovery and/or 
by license agreement. Manufacturers were classified as 
generic if they indicated that they were manufacturers and 
did not have any drugs protected by exclusive patent. 
"Others" were respondents whose classification questions 
indicated that they were neither innovator manufacturers nor 
generic manufacturers, but were qualified on the bid list. 
Question #1: Base = 24 
1. Are you familiar with the Medicaid rebate requirements 
mandated by the OBRA '90, sometimes referred to as the 
Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirement? 
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ANS: # # ( % ) 
( 1) 15 ( 9 3 . 8 ) 
( 2 ) 0 
( 3) 0 


















A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials = 24. 
At an alpha value of .032, x = 17, since observed x's = 24, 
the Null is rejected. The responses exhibit a statistically 
significant preference. 
The results are statistically significant at an alpha 
value of .000. 
Fully 100% of respondents included in the analysis 
indicated that they were aware of the OBRA '90 provisions. 
All classes of respondents indicated an awareness of the 
Act. This is encouraging because it indicates that a 
knowledgeable audience has been reached. These results 
concur with Hypothesis 1: 
---That most manufacturers on the State of 
Rhode Island bid list are familiar with the 
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebate requirements. 











( would be aware of the OBRA '90 provisions: Various 
hypotheses explored in this work, if supported, will show an 
effect upon bidders' daily pricing activities. In addition, 
the potential market is large as the purchases funded by 
Medicaid are estimated to be 10% 20 of the annual 
pharmaceutical market. Also, trade print media has been 
active in the discussion of OBRA, its controversies and 
repercussions in the marketplace. 
Question #2: Base = 24 
2. Does your company participate in the Medicaid rebate 
program? 




MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # (%) 
( 1) 
( 2 ) 
14 (93.3) 
1 (6.7) 
( 3) 0 
no answer = 0 
Statistical Tests: 




# ( % ) # ( % ) 
4 (80) 22 (91.7) 
1 ( 2 0) 2 ( 8 . 3 ) 
0 0 
A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials = 24. 
At a p value of .032, x = 17. Since observed x's = 22 the 
Null is rejected. The responses exhibit a statistically 
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( significant preference. 
At a p level of .000 the results are statistically 
significant. 
An 91.7% of respondents indicated that they currently 
participated in the Medicaid rebate program. Among those 
who identified themselves as manufacturers, 93.3% of 
innovators and 100% of generic manufacturers said they 
participated. 
A majority, 80% of other category respondents also said 
they were participants. Only 8.3% of respondents overall 
said that they did not participate in the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebates. The majority response supports the 
Hypothesis #2: 
---That most manufacturers are participating in 
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
One can reason that of the 20% of other respondents some are 
likely to occupy market segments that are not affected by 
·the OBRA '90 legislation since they are not manufacturers 
according to their responses to the classification questions. 
These individuals might be wholesalers, distributors, etc., 
who are entitled to be on the bid list but are not 
manufacturers. This can be further supported by the fact 
that classification questions showed that 20.8% of 
questionnaire respondents indicated that their company was 
not a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. 
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( Discussion of Results, Questions One and Two: 
Questions one and two were designed to ease respondents 
into the topic of OBRA '90 rebates by asking nonthreatening, 
inoffensive questions in brief, straight - forward language. 
This is highly recommended as a basic tenet of questionnaire 
design by Churchill. 21 Innocuous, nonthreatening questions 
placed at the beginning of questionnaires draw the 
respondent in and convince him/her that involvement will be 
brief and painless. In theory, questions to be asked later 
include those of more emotional or confidential issues 
because the respondent is less likely to become annoyed with 
sensitive issues and discard the questionnaire after some 
time has been invested in answering the earlier questions. 
In editing the answers to question number one, four 
respondents indicated they were unaware of the OBRA '90 
mandated Medicaid rebate requirements. These returns were 
removed from the analysis of results. Tabulations for 
question number two showed a very high rate of participation 
among respondents overall at 91.7% and numbers in the 
affirmative were (93.3% and 100%) among those classified as 
innovator and generic manufacturers respectively. 
High percentages of awareness and participation in the 
OBRA '90 mandated rebates are consistent with the nature of 
the list. The list used was composed of active bidders on 
the Rhode Island Pharmaceutical contracts, a sealed bid 
format. The list is continuously updated. The edition of 

















































bidders could be expected to have knowledge and participate 
in the Medicaid rebates because Medicaid accounts for 
approximately 10% of drug purchases nationwide22 and 
because, as hypothesized elsewhere in this work, the OBRA 
'90 rebates will affect prices available to non-Medicaid 
purchasers. Vendors in such a price aggressive arena as 
submitting sealed bids would likely be aware of the forces 
that impact their ability to price competitively. The OBRA 
'90 rebates are a significant and much publicized 
development in the media. 
Question #3: Base = 24 
3. How likely is your company to begin and/or continue 











ANS: # # ( % ) 
( 1) 14 (93.3) 
( 2 ) 0 
( 3) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 
( 4 ) 0 
( 5 ) 0 
no answer = 0 
GENERIC 
MFR. 
# ( % ) 
3 ( 7 5) 










# ( % ) # ( % ) 
2 ( 4 0) 19 (79.2) 
1 ( 2 0) 2 ( 8 . 3 ) 
1 ( 2 0) 2 ( 8 . 3 ) 
0 0 
1 (20) 1 ( 4 . 2 ) 
( Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from random 
in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (0-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05). 
The value of the test statistic calculated as above for 
question number three is 53.06. The critical value of Chi 
Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488. The value of the test 
statistic is greater than the critical value; therefore, the 
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted. The responses exhibit a 
statistically significant difference from random. 
A total of 79.2% of respondents indicated that they 
were very likely to begin and/or continue participation in 
the program of Medicaid rebates. Combined affirmative 
response, those selecting either likely or very likely, was 
87.5%. Previously in question number two, 91.7% of 
respondents said their company was participating in the 
Medicaid rebate program at the time of the questionnaire. 
Question number three finds a possible (small) reduction in 
participation with 87.5% of respondents answering that their 
company will begin and/or continue participation. In raw 
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( scores this represents only one less response in the 
affirmative. The majority response of 87.5 % supported 
hypotheses H2 and H3: 
H2. ---That most manufacturers are participating 
in the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
H3. ---That most manufacturers will continue to 
participate or will begin to participate in 
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the 
near term (one year). 
Discussion: 
Only 4.2 % of respondents were willing to say that they 
were unlikely or very unlikely to begin and/or continue 
participation. The two responses to this question in the 
"unsure" category (when added to the large number of 
affirmative responses) show that the level of participation 
is likely to continue to be high. Furthermore, once 
committed to participate in the rebate program a company is 
likely to continue participation because the Medicaid 
purchases are substantial, amounting to 10% of all 
pharmaceuticals purchased annually in the United States 23 
and a company is unlikely to ignore such a large market 
segment. 
The literature search led one to believe that a large 
percentage of respondents would continue or begin the rebate 
program and, in fact, 87.5 % intend to do so. As mentioned 
previously, the size of the Medicaid market makes it 
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important to people in the business of selling 
pharmaceuticals. In addition, manufacturers who participate 
in the rebate program have all their drug products covered 
by Medicaid and drugs that are new to the market will be 
covered immediately and not have to wait until each state 
accepts a particular drug into its Medicaid program. As 
reported by Coster: 
"Drug manufacturers have significant incentives to 
participate in the Medicaid rebate program since there 
will be no federal matching funds available for the 
drugs of those manufacturers that have not entered into 
a rebate agreement. However, manufacturers that have 
rebate agreements in effect will have their products 
covered by the state Medicaid programs. This is a 
significant victory for all the drug companies since 
many states do not cover all the drug products of all 
manufacturers due to cost and patient care reasons. In 
addition, there is usually a significant time lag 
between the markets of a new drug and acceptance by a 
state Medicaid program. Now, all new drugs will have 
to be covered immediately by a state Medicaid program 
for a period of not less than six months after 
approval. All these benefits will have significant 
"spill-over" effects on prescribing of a company's 
products by physicians i24other sectors of the 
ambulatory care market." 
Clearly, Coster makes a strong argument that it is in 
manufacturers own best interests to participate. 
Of respondents who said their company did not 
participate, those companies may be nonparticipating 
because their involvement in the pharmaceutical industry 
may be as other than a manufacturer. Responders who were 
unsure or (very) unlikely to participate were composed 
mostly (66.7%) of those classified as other than a generic 
or innovator manufacturer. While most respondents from 
the selected universe sold pharmaceuticals that they 
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manufactured, the list is not restricted to manufacturing. 
Other business entities that sell pharmaceuticals such as 
wholesalers or repackers, to name but two possibilities, may 
qualify for the list and can and do win bid acquisitions. 
Not being manufacturers they would not participate as a 
matter of course in the Medicaid rebate program. 
Assessing question number three using just respondents 
who classified themselves as generic or innovator 
manufacturers, lends a much stronger impression of majority 
response. Responses for innovator and generic manufacturers 
were 93.3% and 100% respectively that their companies would 
continue and/or begin Medicaid rebates. 
Clearly, most participants in the Medicaid rebates 
expect to continue, and as show in question two, most are 
participating now. Thus, with continuing industry 
participation, factors that this research show as likely to 
be a result of changes instigated by OBRA '90 are likely to 
remain factors in the marketplace in the near term. 
Question #4: Base = 24 
4. What effect, if any, do you think the Medicaid rebates 

















Effect of rebates on gross profit? 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 0 0 0 0 
( 2 ) 0 1 (25) 0 1 ( 4. 2) 
( 3) 0 1 (25) 0 1 ( 4. 2) 
( 4 ) 13 (86.7) 1 ( 25) 3 ( 60) 17 (70.8) 
( 5 ) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 1 ( 25) 2 ( 40) 4 (16.7) 
no answer 1 
Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from random 
in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05). 
The value of the test statistic for question number 
four as calculated above with n = 24 and p (probability) 
0.2 is 41.8. The critical value of Chi Square (.05) with df 
= 4 is 9.488. Since the value of the test statistic is 
greater than the critical value the Alternate Hypothesis is 
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( accepted: the responses exhibit a stat is t .i ca 11 y significant 
preference. 
87.5% of respondents predicted their company would 
experience at least some decrease in Gross Prof it margin in 
their pharmaceutical line. Of the responders, 4 or 16.7%, 
characterized the expected decrease as a strong decrease in 
profit. These results support the Hypothesis H4: 
---That a majority of manufacturers will expect to 
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of 
furnishing Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid 
plan. 
Discussion: 
This question branched respondents. Those who expected 
decreases were directed to question number five. Others who 
did not expect a decrease were directed to question number 
six because if respondent did not expect a profit decrease 
then question number five, concerning methods anticipated of 
recovering profit loss, becomes irrelevant. 
For 1992, OBRA '90 requires that manufacturers give 
Medicaid a minimum rebate of 12.5% (see Appendix 3) of the 
Average Manufacturers Price {AMP) or their "best price" to 
any purchaser as defined by OBRA '90, subject to a cap of 
50% of the AMP. Estimates are that . . "Medicaid's new 
prudent purchasing legislation is expected to save federal 
and state taxpayers from two to three point four billion 
dollars over five years. 1125 Because of the dollars 
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I involved, it is expected that this program will have a 
discernible effect on a company's gross profit, and that a 
majority of respondents' opinions indicate that they 
expected at least some decrease in gross profit. Responses 
by category were: innovator manufacturers, 93.4%, some 
measure of decrease; generic manufacturers, 50%, some 
measure of decrease; and, "other", 100%, at least some 
decrease. 
Clearly, this response supports this hypothesis. To 
have billions of dollars removed by government fiat from an 
industry should have some impact on profits. And, in fact, 
the anticipated dollar rebates for 1991 will exceed the 
estimates according to a report in The Pipeline, 
"Prescription drug expenditures for the 1991 Medicaid 
program totaled $5.3 billion or $0.6 billion more than the 
$4.7 billion that . . (was) . predicted for FY 1991. 26 
As Medicaid's total expenditure rises, the amount of funds 
generated by the minimum 12.5% rebate rises. 
A small number of respondents (4.2%) indicated that 
they Medicaid rebates would have no effect on their 
company's gross profit. An equal number (4.2%) predicted 
that their company would experience some increase in 
profits. 
An increase in profits is possible in some cases 
because, although it seems obvious that the siphoning off of 
funds in the form of Medicaid rebates would always decrease 
the gross profit, there are some scenarios where a profit 
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I increase is possible. For instance, as a compromise with 
manufacturers, those who choose to participate in the 
Medicaid rebate program will benefit from the fact " 
(that) . now all drugs will have to be covered 
immediately by a state Medicaid program II 27 If a 
manufacturer had some profitable drugs that were previously 
excluded from Medicaid, their inclusion now might result in 
an overall financial benefit. Another area of possible new 
profit is to manufacturers who have recently introduced or 
are about to introduce new drugs. Since OBRA '90 mandates 
that participating manufacturers shall have all drugs 
included for Medicaid coverage immediately upon introduction 
to the general market, and state Medicaid approval can take 
some time before a new entity is accepted for coverage, then 
immediate coverage could present a new profit opportunity. 
It is reasonable to accept the possibility that a small 
percentage of respondents is anticipating increased profit 
as a result of this law. 
Question #5: Base = 19 
5. Which of these strategies is your company most likely to 
employ, other than price increases, to recover any profit 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 4 (26.7) 0 0 4 ( 21) 
( 2 ) 5 (33.3) 1 (25) 2 (40) 8 (42.1) 
( 3 ) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 1 (25) 0 2 ( 10. 5) 
( 4 ) 3 ( 2 0) 0 1 (20) 4 ( 21) 
( 5 ) 6 ( 4 0) 0 1 ( 2 0) 7 (36.8) 
no answer 6 
Note: total may add to more than 100% because of multiple 
mentions. 
Statistical Tests: 
Chi Square "goodness of fit test": 
Question number five requires a Chi Square test. 
Regrettably, because of multiple responses this cannot be 
done with the data available. Re-tabbing the questionnaires 
to eliminate multiple results in 16 useable responses, which 
gives an expected frequency of 3.2 per cell. Since it is 
necessary to assume at least five responses per cell to 
perform the Chi Square "goodness of fit test", the test 
statistic would be highly unreliable. That the Chi test 
cannot be done because this necessary assumption cannot be 
met, does not mean that the results are insignificant; 
rather, it means that they cannot be adequately tested. 
Statistical inferences regarding the population may not be 
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( drawn from these results; what follows is a report of 
responses. 
Question number five was asked only of those 
respondents who indicated in question number four 
that they expected their company to experience some 
measure of Gross Profit margin decrease because of 
the mandated Medicaid rebates. The remaining 79.2% of 
the respondents, therefore, completed question number 
five. 
The most frequent response to this question was 
expansion of markets at 42.1%, followed closely by "other" 
at 36.8%. While 21% of the respondents felt that their 
company would cut advertising, an equal number, 21%, said 
their company would reduce research expenditure. The option 
with the lowest response was to cut manufacturing costs 
(10.5%). 
In summary, 21% of all those polled supported 
Hypothesis HS: 
-- - That a reduction in profits because of the 
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates will cause 
a reduction in funds available to support 
research. 
Discussion: 
The responses to question number five were too few to 
support statistical analysis. It may be of interest, 
however, to examine the proportions of responses in relation 
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to opinions expressed in the literature. Published 
sentiments implied that research expenditures were huge and 
that a reduction in revenues caused by the OBRA '90 rebates 
would have the effect of diminishing funds available for 
research: 
and: 
" . the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
(PMA) estimates that in 1992, $10.9 billion will be 
invested in R & D which would be 13.5% more than the 
1991 expenditure of $9.6 billion. The industry's 
investment in R & D has been increasing at a greater 
rate than its sales ... but the number of new 
chemical entities developed through the years has 
been decre29ing due to the increased cost of 
research." 
" . the pharmaceutical industry invests the 
highest percentage of annual sales in R & D 29 
compared to other research-intensive industries." 
One reason that if all innovator manufacturers on 
the mailing list responded, there would be a greater 
percentage of responses predicting an impact on research 
and development dollars available in the future. If 
innovator manufacturers are more likely to have research 
facilities than other classes of respondents, it is 
possible that the effect on research programs is greater 
than the survey results suggest since only 62.5% of 
respondents classified themselves as innovator 
manufacturers. 
Question number five was designed to ask about price 
increases without introducing bias by being inflammatory 
and to see if anticipated gross profit loss would affect 
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research funding. It was felt that directly asking 
respondents if they were going to "raise prices to everyone 
else" would sensitize the issue. Such price questions to an 
industry that is currently receiving unfavorable accounts in 
the media about prices would likely be inflammatory. 
Instead, respondents were asked if they were contemplating 
other strategies to recoup lost profit margins due to 
Medicaid rebates. "Reduce research expenditure" was one of 
the closed end choices. 
It was anticipated that a significant number of. 
respondents would feel that research funding would be 
diminished as one of the historic reasons cited for high 
prescription drug prices is the claimed enormous cost of 
funding drug research, prof its must be generated to pay 
research and development costs (reputedly 230 million 
dollars per drug, see below). As Gerald J. Mossinghoff 
(President of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) 
' has stated: 
"The research-based pharmaceutical industry invests 
17% of sales in R & D ... this commitment to 
research will result in future breakthrough drugs 
.the proposals advanced by Senator David Pryor 
would
11
30early dampen the incentives to innovate 
. . . 
Because it is a prestige issue, and, therefore, 
possibly sensitizing to respondents, no classification 
questions were included in the questionnaire regarding 
research facilities. Therefore, it is not possible to 
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tabulate responses according to size and success of research 
facilities. If a 100% response to the questionnaire was 
received and all innovator manufacturers were tabulated 
separately, such a tabulation might allow more accurate 
conclusions about the impact of OBRA '90 on research and 
development dollars. 
While one cannot make inferences on the basis of 15 
respondents, that any innovator manufacturers would expect 
to reduce research dollars is worthy of note. The cost of 
developing a new pharmaceutical and bringing it to market is 
large, 
" . R & D spending has continued to increase until 
it now costs approximately $230 million to develop 31 product to the point of submitting an N.D.A .... " 
An 20% of innovator respondents indicated that there 
will be some reduction· in funds available to support 
research as a result of the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid 
rebates. Historically, innovator manufacturers, with their 
generous research and development budgets have been 
responsible for most of the breakthroughs in new pharmaceu-
ticals and families of new pharmaceutical entities. 
Question #6: Base = 24 
6. Some purchasers believe that mandated discounts to 
Medicaid have exerted upward pressure on the prices of 
pharmaceuticals available to the public through channels 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 5 ( 33. 3) 1 ( 25) 1 ( 2 0) 7 (29.2) 
( 2 ) 7 (46.7) 2 ( 5 0) 3 (60) 12 ( 50) 
( 3) 1 ( 6. 7) 1 ( 25) 1 (20) 3 ( 12. 5) 
( 4 ) 0 0 0 0 
( 5 ) 2 (13.3) 0 0 2 ( 8. 3) 
no answer 0 
Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from 
random in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha .05). The value 
of the test statistic calculated as above for question 
number six with n = 24 and (probability) p = 0.2 is 20.28. 
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( The critical value of Chi Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488. 
Since the value of the test statistic is greater than the 
critical value, the Alternate Hypothesis is accepted: the 
responses exhibit a statistically significant preference. 
An 79.2% of all respondents felt that mandated Medicaid 
discounts have exerted upward pressure on prices (50% agree; 
29.2% agree strongly). Thus, a majority support the 
Hypothesis H6A: 
---That the OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment 
of the pharmaceutical market will have the effect 
of exerting an upward influence on prices available 
to buyers other than Medicaid. 
Conversely, only 8.3% of respondents took the opposite view 
and disagreed (strongly) that the mandated Medicaid rebates 
have exerted upward pressure on prices available to other 
market segments. Only 12.5% selected no opinion on this 
question. 
Discussion: 
.I n interpreting the significance of the response to 
this question, it must be acknowledged as a source of bias 
that manufacturers might find it convenient to blame the 
government regulations for some of the major price increases 
described in the media. 
A counter argument to this bias is to note that the 
only two responses that disagreed (disagree strongly) with 
the notion that Medicaid rebates exerted upward pressure on 
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( pharmaceutical prices were from the innovator group. These 
responses are significant because they are contrary to the 
standard "party line" which seeks to avoid blame for price 
increases. This dissent, then, tends to support the premise 
that respondents' answers are unbiased in that respondents 
seem to answer with their own opinion rather than an 
association public relations line. 
Respondents clearly feel that upward pressure on their 
drug prices has been exerted by the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebates and this agrees with published comments. 
This finding was in keeping with the hypothesis that 
artificial downward pressure on prices to a particular 
segment would result in compensating upward pressures to 
other segments or a "cost shifting." It can be reasoned 
that manufacturers would not willingly become less price 
competitive in the absence of upward pressure provided by 
OBRA '90. 
Did the OBRA '90 mandated rebates cause price increase 
to other buyers? Many anecdotal reports of drug price 
increases of up to three times the rate of inflation and 
caused by the OBRA '90 mandated rebates have appeared in the 
professional print media. For instance, "according to ASHP 
(American Society of Hospital Pharmacists) (their 
survey) . confirms what it predicted last year, that the 
law would have the unintended effect of raising drug costs 
to hospitals, HMO's, and community health centers. 1132 The 
ASHP says their poll has received reports of hospitals and 
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( nonprofit organizations experiencing major price increases. 
The many articles suggest a consensus that the Medicaid 
rebates have sparked, either fairly or unfairly, large price 
hikes in bid and contract purchasing. Senator David Pryor 
has characterized the situation as, ". . numerous 
confirmed reports that some drug manufacturers are in the 
process of reducing discounts . . breaking long term 
contracts, and refusing to negotiate in good faith over 
price" 33 Of course, reducing or eliminating deep discounts 
historically available to competitive procurement has the 
same effect as raising the price to those purchasers. If 
one customarily receives a 40% discount and suddenly is 
given only a 15% discount on drug purchases, that would 
cause a significant increase in drug acquisition cost. 
The upward pressure of mandated Medicaid rebates .has 
been reasoned and articulated as follows by Cano: 
. "Economic realities suggest there is a strong 
likelihood that major manufacturers will shift costs 
to private payer3 4as a result of the proposal's implementation." 
Another source that continues in this vein is a report 
of topics discussed at the American Pharmaceutical 
Association (APhA) annual meeting. The report sa~d: 
. "Pharmaceutical manufacturers are said to be 
raising prices to other purchasers, including other 
government agencies, jg recover the discounts being 
offered to Medicaid." 
Because of published statements such as these, it is 
expected that the majority of responses would blame the OBRA 
'90 rebates at least somewhat for these reported price 
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hikes. In conformance with this, 79.2% of respondents 
agreed or agreed strongly that mandated Medicaid discounts 
have exerted upward pressure on prices. Only 8.3% of the 
respondents opposed, indicating they did not believe the 
OBRA '90 rebates ex~rted upward pressure on pharmaceutical 
prices available to the public through channels other than 
Medicaid. On this issue, 12.5% expressed no opinion at the 
time of the questionnaire. 
Provision of the mandated Medicaid discounts will cause 
manufacturers to raise prices in other market segments. 
This upward pressure will also affect group bid 
acquisitions; and questions ten and eleven will examine this 
issue specifically. 
Question #7: Base = 24 
7. Which of the following drug purchasers, in general, 
currently receives your lowest price for your single and/or 
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ANS: # # ( % ) 
( 1) 2 (13.3) 
( 2 ) 1 ( 6. 7) 
( 3) 0 
( 4 ) 0 
( 5) 2 (13.3) 
( 6 ) 9 ( 60) 
( 7) 0 
( 8 ) 1 ( 6. 7) 
( 9) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 
( 10) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 
no answer 0 
double mentions = l* 
triple mentions l* 
GENERIC 
MR. 




1 ( 2 5) 
1 ( 2 5) 
1 ( 2 5) 
0 
1 ( 2 5) 
0 
1 ( 25) 
"OTHER" 










1 ( 2 0) 
TOTAL 
# ( % ) 
4 (16.7) 









*NOTE: some totals may equal more than 100% because of 
multiple mentions. 
Statistical Test: 
This question is tested in the binomial form, do you 
charge all purchasers the same price? 
A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials = 24. 
At an alpha value of .032, x = 17. Since observed x's = 21, 
the null is rejected. The responses exhibit a statistically 
significant preference. 
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The results are significant at an alpha value of .0001. 
Discussion: 
H6B: 
Question number seven was designed to test Hypothesis 
---That all purchasers do not necessarily pay the 
same price for pharmaceuticals. 
The wide variations in response support the premise 
that prices do vary among purchasers because many different 
respondents indicated many different groups of purchasers as 
recipients of their lowest price. 
The Veterans Administration was the price winner, 
having been mentioned as receiving the lowest price 50% of 
the time. Interestingly, 12.5% of the respondents said all 
their customers received the same price. This was 
unexpected as conventional wisdom accepts for granted that 
different purchasers arrange unique pricing according to 
competitive arrangements and bargaining ability: 
II 
. The characteristic of competitive market conditions 
was found to significantly influence lowering of prices 
offered to purchasing groups. 1136 These respondents were 
excused from question number eight. 
Medicaid was selected as low price by 16.7% of the 
respondents. It is impossible to know if that were true for 
those respondents before the OBRA '90 act took effect. 
However, since Senator David H. Pryor has maintained that 
legislation creating the OBRA '90 rebates was necessary 
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because ". . Medicaid . (is) . charged the highest 
prices . "37 The argument can be made that this is the 
effect of the OBRA '90 mandated rebates. At the time of 
questionnaire response, OBRA '90 mandated rebates had 
already become active. OBRA '90 reserves to Medicaid the 
"best price." Medicaid and Veterans Administration are not 
mutually exclusive choices for low price because Veterans 
Administration depot 38 pricing is exempt from the "best 
price" calculations and, therefore, a manufacturer can give 
the depot a lower price than Medicaid and still give 
Medicaid its OBRA '90-defined "best price". 
Buying groups, companies like Vector, whose business it 
is to negotiate (low) contract pricing with manufacturers 
for clients such as hospitals, were selected by respondents 
as receiving the lowest price 12.5% of the time while . State 
Government, wholesalers, and "none of these" were each 
selected by 4.2% of respondents. Hospitals were said to 
receive the lowest price from just 4.2% of respondents also. 
No respondents said that either independent pharmacies or 
chain pharmacies received their lowest price. 
Question seven demonstrates that different segments of 
the marketplace do receive different pricing for 
pharmaceuticals and is appropriate to this work since this 
thesis is in large part dedicated to exploring the effect of 
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates on market segments 
other than Medicaid in general and in particular the market 
segment of pharmaceutical purchasing that is competitive bid 
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purchasing. In fact, different segments of the marketplace 
receive very different prices. 
The following attempts a brief explanation of some 
aspects of pharmaceutical pricing. Most people who think of 
pharmaceuticals envision a neighborhood drug store. Such 
drug stores acquire their pharmaceuticals from a wholesaler. 
They are charged a "wholesale price"; perhaps they receive 
an additional discount from this price also, individual 
arrangements vary greatly. The wholesalers buy their 
pharmaceuticals from a manufacturer; they pay less than 
"wholesale." The price wholesalers are charged, their 
acquisition cost, is defined by OBRA '90 as the "Average 
Manufacturers Price" (AMP). Most of the other drug buyers 
listed in question number seven employ various strategies in 
an attempt to pay as little as possible for their 
pharmaceuticals. The mechanism most of these purchasers 
employ to obtain better pricing, sometimes on their own 
behalf and sometimes through buying services, is the 
competitive bid. Bids solicit price offers from 
manufacturers using the force of competition to apply as 
much leverage as possible in order to obtain better prices. 
Some purchasers are more successful in obtaining low prices 
than others. This is a result of many factors, even the 
type of purchaser, that is, hospital, nonprofit hospital, 
charitable hospital, institution, charitable institution, 
and so forth. Some other more familiar factors might 
include dollar volume, length of contract, return policy, 
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( etc., to name but a few variables. In general, one can say 
the more co~petition created for the available dollars, the 
lower the prices, as found by Raehtz et al.: 
"The characteristic of competitive market conditions 
was found to significantly inf~~ence lowering of prices 
offered to purchasing groups." 
Among all these purchasers, the Veterans Administration 
depot prices are reputed to be the lowest. In fact, OBRA 
'90 exempts the Veterans Administration acquisitions for the 
following reason: 
" . the Federal government depot . (low) 
prices reflect the manufacturer's costs of delivering 
the pro~tlct in bulk to a provider, without packaging 
costs." 
In line with such statements, the Veterans 
Administration was selected most frequently, 50% of the 
time, as receiving a respondent's lowest price. Observing 
the results in just innovator manufacturers the percentage 
extending their lowest price to the Veterans Administration 
was 60%. 
In all, respondents made selections in eight separate 
categories. This is evidence that prices vary widely among 
various market segments. This supports the hypothesis that 
all purchasers do not necessarily pay the same price for 
pharmaceuticals. 
Worthy of note is the result that the only two 
categories that did not receive anyone's lowest price were 
independent pharmacies and chain pharmacies. Those units 
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( anyone's lowest price. Additional evidence that prices vary 
among purchasers is that pharmacy organizations have long 
recognized these price variations and discussed this pricing 
as a central topic to their business even to the point of 
mobilizing to affect some change. The National Association 
of Retail Druggists (NARD) has introduced a resolution to 
demand equal access to pricing for retail pharmacies and 
describes the existence of "multi tier pricing" as . . . "the 
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source of most of independent pharmacies problems." 
Question #8: Base = 21 
8. If you did not check "same price", how likely do you 
think that the OBRA legislation will provide an incentive to 












ANS: # # ( % ) 
( 1) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 
( 2 ) 2 (13.3) 
( 3) 1 ( 6. 7) 
( 4 ) 6 (40) 
( 5) 4 (26.7) 
no answer 1 
GENERIC 
MFR. 
# ( % ) 
0 
1 ( 25) 
1 (25) 
0 







# ( % ) # ( % ) 
0 1 ( 4 . 8) 
0 3 ( 14. 3) 
0 2 ( 9 . 5 ) 
2 (37.5) 8 ( 38) 
2 ( 2 5) 7 (33.3) 
Statistical Test: 
The Binomial Sign Test is used, "unsure" and no answers 
are eliminated, therefore n = 19. The alpha value at 5% 
significance is .031 for x = 14. Since the observed x's 
15, the Null is rejected. A statistically significant 
preference is shown by the data. 
The results are significant at an alpha value of .007. 
Question number eight was asked of 21 eligible 
respondents. The largest group of respondents, 38%, thought 
the OBRA '90 legislation was unlikely to provide an 
incentive to charge all purchasers the same price and an 
additional 33.3% thought that it was very unlikely. That 
is, a better than two-thirds majority (71.3%) support the 
Hypothesis H6C: 
---That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers to 
receive the same price. 
Only 19.1% of responders answered that the OBRA '90 
legislation would likely or very likely provide an incentive 
to charge all purchasers the same price. Nine point five 
percent (9.5%) of respondents stated they were unsure. 
Discussion: 
As of the date of response, the answers suggest that 
there will be no mass move to single pricing as a result of 
OBRA '90. If single pricing became the norm, medical buyers 
would save effort and overhead involved in price 
negotiations. The response suggests that medical buyers 
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will still have to spend a great deal of effort, as well as 
overhead dollars, making sure their clients/employers 
receive the best price available to their market segment. 
This means that later discussions in this work of OBRA '90's 
effect on bid purchasing will remain relevant at least in 
the near term. 
Seventy-one point three percent (71.3%) of respondents 
at the time of the questionnaire thought that the OBRA '90 
was unlikely or very unlikely to provide an incentive to 
charge all purchasers the same price. This might be 
expected as OBRA '90 was never meant to encourage uniform 
pricing. OBRA '90's purpose was to secure discounts on 
pharmaceutical pricing for the Medicaid program. 
The 12.5% of respondents to question seven who said 
they charged all buyers the same price were directed to skip 
this question. 
A minority of respondents (19.1%) thought OBRA would 
provide an incentive to charge all purchasers the same 
price. This sentiment has some support in the professional 
media. At the Northeast Pharmaceutical Conference, the Vice 
President of Glaxo, the second largest manufacturer in sales 
of pharmaceuticals, predicted the gap between the lowest and 
the highest pharmaceutical prices will narrow as a result of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, "We have to lower the 
h . h . 11 . th 1 . 4 2 ig price as we as raise e ow price. 
Even if prices do get closer, however, they may not 
necessarily become the same for all market segments. This 
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is supported by the questionnaire results. The continued 
existence of varied pricing means that pharmaceutical buyers 
will probably still rely on the bid system to obtain low 
prices through competition. As Lindsay has said regarding 
competition: 
"The available data indicate that there is much greater 
price flexibility and price competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry than has generally been 
assumed. Competition in prices between several sets of 
competing drugs has produced a downward trend4 ~n prices, relative to other consumer products." 
To ensure this competition, bid instruments will still be a 
valuable tool in market segments that previously relied on 
competitive bid acquisitions. 
Question #9: Base = 24 
9. As the legislation requires a 12.5% discount from AMP or 
a "manufacturers best price," how likely is your company to 
publish these Medicaid prices, for example, in the company 
catalog, the REDBOOK, etc., so that other groups may use 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 0 1 ( 25) 0 1 ( 4 . 2 ) 
( 2 ) 0 0 0 0 
( 3 ) 2 (13.3) 0 0 2 ( 8 . 3 ) 
( 4 ) 1 ( 6. 7) 3 ( 7 5 ) 3 ( 6 0) 7 (29.2) 
( 5 ) 11 (73.3) 0 2 (40) 13 ( 54. 2) 
no answer 1 
Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from 
·random in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05). The test 
statistic for question number nine is calculated as above 
with n = 23 and (probability) p = 0.2. The value of the 
test statistic is 20.6. The critical value of Chi Square 
(.05) with df = 4 is 9.488. Since the value of the test 
statistic is greater than the critical value, the Alternate 
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Hypothesis is accepted: the responses exhibit a 
statistically significant preference. 
A majority (83.4%) of respondents said their company 
was unlikely or very unlikely to publish their Medicaid 
prices. This majority supports the Hypothesis H6D: 
---That while a "best price" will be known and 
established in order to calculate the Medicaid 
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally 
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool 
or benchmark against which they might judge the 
success of their acquisitions. 
Of the 83.4% who responded in this fashion, fully 54.2% of 
the total respondents qualified their answer as very 
unlikely that their company would publish the prices. Only 
one respondent to the questionnaire thought that his company 
would publish the prices, while 8.3% of respondents were 
unsure. 
Discussion: 
It is easily understood on the basis of competition 
that manufacturers would prefer their prices to remain 
confidential. However, it removes the potential of, for 
instance, the State of Rhode Island accepting the U.S. 
Government price or that price plus a negotiated or bid 
"markup" as the contract price for the manufacturers 
pharmaceuticals. Accepting such a "Government Price" would 
save much work and expense by circumventing the formal bid 
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process. One of the elements needed to do this is, 
according to Rhode Island State Purchasing practices, a 
satisfactory industry-wide verifiable price listing to be 
used as baseline. Perhaps, if it were widely available, the 
Medicaid "best price" could be that missing element. 
Historically, such information has been closely held by 
manufacturers even when testifying before Senate 
subcommittees. In an interview published in February 1990, 
Senator David H. Pryor enters into a discussion of the 
price of pharmaceuticals, especially as it relates to 
Medicaid pricing, and the reluctance of the drug industry to 
testify before Pryer's committee regarding price, profits, 
cost of development, etc. An especially contentious issue 
between Pryor and the drug companies is the appearance of 
what is described as ever escalating drug prices and the 
refusal of manufacturers to surrender their records to 
. . f h . d h h. h . 44 JUSti y t eir nee to c arge ig er prices. Viewed in 
this light, it is surprising that any respondents would 
think that their company would publish sensitive price data. 
Respondents who answered unsure may be reflecting the 
opinion that with the federal government involvement through 
OBRA '90 that confidentiality might be impossible. For 
instance, though it does not state that pricing data will be 
disclosed, the OBRA legislation does provide: 
'' . That a report on pricing for prescription drugs 
purchased by the Department of Veterans Affairs, other 
federal programs, community and hospital pharmacies, 
and other purchasing groups and managed care plans will 
be submitted to several designated congressional 
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committees. 1145 
This misunderstanding, if indeed present, might have been 
eliminated if the question had asked respondents to state 
their company's preference regarding the publication of 
prices. For example, "does you company favor publishing 
these Medicaid prices and/or unit rebates, total rebates, 
etc:", the response might have been closer to a unanimous 
negative. 
The 83.4 % response is supportive of the hypothesis and 
could possibly even understate respondents' desire to keep 
price information confidential. The response also 
illustrates, it is highly unlikely that pharmaceutical 
buyers will be able to employ any shortcuts in their bid 
acquisitions such as may have been provided by the 
publication of the prices supplies to Medicaid. 
Question #10: Base = 24 
***Many segments of the pharmaceutical market practice 
competitive procurement, that ls, sealed bids, contract 
purchasing, buying groups and so forth. The following 
questions are designed to assess how this legislation will 
impact the prices your company will offer to these groups. 
10. Because of the OBRA '90 legislation, my company's 
ability to extend special pricing to competitive procurement 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 0 0 0 0 
( 2 ) 0 0 0 0 
( 3 ) 5 (33.3) 2 ( 50) 1 ( 2 0) 8 (33.3) 
( 4 ) 6 ( 4 0) 0 4 ( 80) 10 (41.7) 
( 5) 3 ( 2 0) 2 ( 5 0) 0 5 (20.8) 
no answer = 1 
Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from 
random in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha = .OS). The value 
of the test statistic calculated as above with n = 23 and 
(probability) p = 0.2 is 18.07%. The critical value of Chi 
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Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488. Since the value of the 
test statistic is greater than the critical value, the 
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted: the responses exhibit a 
statistically significant preference. 
Most (62.5%) of respondents through their company's 
ability to extend special pricing to competitive procurement 
groups for innovator drugs would be either decreased or 
greatly decreased by OBRA '90. The majority, then, support 
the Hypothesis H6A: 
- --That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment of 
the pharmaceutical market will have the effect of 
exerting an upward influence on prices available 
to buyers other than Medicaid. 
Thirty- three point three percent (33.3%) thought this 
ability would not be affected, while 4.2% did not answer. 
Discussion: 
It was anticipated that a very large number of 
respondents would indicate that OBRA '90 mandated discounts 
to Medicaid would cause price increases to other buyers 
because Medicaid comprises 10% of the pharmaceutical market 
in the United States and this is a significant market 
portion. 
As OBRA '90 reserves to Medicaid a substantial rebate 
from the Average Manufacturers Price (AMP) or the 
manufacturers "best price," whichever is less, the incentive 
will be for manufacturers to stop offering deep discounts 
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because: 
"Medicaid accounts for a sizeable chunk- - perhaps 10% on 
average--of their revenues. Now that Medicaid will be 
entitled to considerable rebates and eventually to the 
"best price" available to other buyers, it's only 
sensible for producer~ 6 to protect their interests by 
raising prices . . . " 
Also, it is reasoned that forced discounts to Medicaid 
will exert upward pressure on prices available to other 
market segments as manufacturers attempt to maintain 
profitability despite significant revenues being consumed by 
rebates. . an estimated 3.4 billion dollars over five 
years . 
While 62.5% is not as large a majority as might have 
been expected, in light of such statements, it is still a 
considerable majority. Answers here may be skewed by the 
actual products of each manufacturer and by complex 
marketing decisions made at each corporate headquarters. A 
manufacturer with several innovator drugs, unique to their 
market niche, would be less affected by OBRA '90 because 
such a product line does not sell strictly on the basis of 
price and the manufacturer is under less price competitive 
pressure. That is, when a therapeutically unique drug (not 
substitutable) is indicated because of clinical 
considerations, for example, potency, lack of side effects, 
compatibility, etc., price is removed as a consideration 
from prescribing and purchasing. A manufacturer who enjoys 
such a technologically superior product line is less 
inclined to discount to various purchasers and would likely 
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be less affected by the need to provide bids to purchasing 
groups who are looking for the lowest prices. 
There is another area of consideration that may have 
lowered the majority percentage. Those respondents, 
(12.5%), to question number seven who said their company 
charged all buyers the same price. If, for any reason, a 
manufacturer gives little or no discount to states, 
hospitals, bid groups, etc., in the first place, then the 
OBRA '90's effect on a manufacturers group procurement 
policies would be diminished. In the case of these vendors 
who stated they charged everyone the same price, OBRA '90 
could be expected to affect their bidding performance only 
minimally. Their answers, if consistent, may account for 
some of the 33.3% who maintained that their ability to 
extend special pricing to competitive bid groups would be 
unaffected. This fact tends to understate the majority 
support of this hypothesis (6A). 
How do OBRA '90 rebates influence bid prices? The 
mechanics of this effect may be as follows. Before OBRA 
'90, a manufacturer in a competitive situation, a bid for 
instance, could charge whatever (low) price it chose. If it 
wished to pursue business in a certain sector, a teaching 
hospital, for example, it might set a very low price, 
perhaps even below cost. OBRA '90, by requiring 
manufacturers to rebate a percentage of AMP or extend the 
manufacturers "best price" to Medicaid, whichever is lower, 
discourages deep discounts. A manufacturer who captures 
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some business by entering a low bid to a competitive 
purchasing market segment may have to reduce its Medicaid 
price below what would have been the discounted AMP amount. 
Then, it can be reasoned, OBRA '90's "best price" to 
Medicaid bars nongovernment and nonexempt buyers from 
receiving a price that is lower. The majority of 
respondents, which may in fact be understated, have answered 
that OBRA '90 has diminished their ability to extend special 
pricing to competitive procurement groups. 
Questions ten and eleven were asked of the entire 
sample. Those answering that they charged all buyers the 
same price in question seven, 12.5%, could have answered 
accurately that OBRA '90 would have no effect on their 
ability to extend special pricing as they apparently do not 
pursue this kind of business. While it is appropriate to 
include these respondents to study if their ability would 
change, their inclusion in this analysis also lowers the 
number who said OBRA '90 would affect their ability to 
extend special pricing. 
In addition, some of those respondents who have been 
classified as other than innovator or generic manufacturer 
may be wholesalers, or unit dose distributors, or businesses 
who may not be involved in competitive bid processes. 
Wholesalers, while they may be active bidders, are 
unaffected by legislation that requires rebates from 
manufacturers and would accurately describe themselves as 
unaffected. 
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In question two, it was seen that 8.3% of all 
respondents did not participate in the rebate program. 
Non - participants in the rebate program would also be 
unaffected by OBRA '90. 
Another factor that lowers the majority result is the 
manufacturers product line. Question ten relates 
specifically to innovator drugs. Any respondents who market 
drugs, but not innovator drugs, that is, a generic 
manufacturer, would appropriately respond that they were not 
affected. 
Finally, it is important to note that no one said they 
expected the OBRA '90 legislation to allow increased ability 
to extend special pricing. 
For all these reasons then, the 62.5% response that 
expected a decrease in the ability to extend special pricing 
adequately supports the hypothesis that purveyors of 
innovator drugs are less able to extend special prices to 
·competitive procurement groups because of OBRA '90 
legislation. 
Question #11: Base = 24 
11. Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability 
to extend special pricing to competitive procurement 
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MFR. MFR. "OTHER" TOTAL 
ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 0 0 0 0 
( 2 ) 0 0 0 0 
( 3 ) 7 (46.7) 2 ( 50) 2 ( 4 0) 11 (45.8) 
( 4 ) 5 (33.3) 2 ( 50) 3 ( 60) 10 (41.7) 
( 5 ) 2 (13.3) 0 0 2 ( 8 . 3 ) 
no answer = 1 
Statistical Tests: 
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see 
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses equal random 
distribution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses differ from random 
in a statistically significant fashion. 
Chi Square is calculated: 
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E 
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and 
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha .05). The value 
of the test statistic calculated as above with n = 23 and 
(probability) p = 0.2 is 25.91. The critical value of Chi 
76 
( Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488. Since the value of the 
test statistic is greater than the critical value, the 
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted: the responses exhibit a 
statistically significant preference. 
At the time of questionnaire response, 45.8% of those 
responding said that their ability would not be affected 
while 50% thought their ability would be either decreased or 
greatly decreased. For generic drugs then, exactly one half 
of respondents support the hypothesis H6A: 
---That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment 
of the pharmaceutical market will have the 
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence 
on prices available to buyers other than 
Medicaid. 
Discussion: 
Question eleven was asked of the entire sample. There 
are some factors, discussed previously in question ten, 
which may have affected respondents answers so as to 
understate the support for the hypothesis. Factors that may 
have increased the number of respondents selecting 
unaffected are: 
The entire sample was polled and this included 
respondents who answered that they charged all buyers 
the same price in question seven. 
Some respondents classified as other may not be 
manufacturers and thus not affected by OBRA '90. 
Some responders may not supply special discounts to bid 
acquisitions anyway. 
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Those respondents in question two (8.3 %) who said 
they did not participate in the rebate program would 
be unaffected. 
The percentage of respondents selecting unaffected is 
45.8 %. Some of this considerable number may have been due 
to respondents who thought their ability to bid generic drug 
prices would be unaffected because of internal policy 
adjustments made in direct response to the OBRA '90 mandated 
rebate provisions. January 1991 was the effective date of 
the OBRA '90 regulations. Generic companies were required 
by the provisions of OBRA '90 to rebate to Medicaid 
suff i cient funds to result in a discount equivalent to 10 % 
below the AMP, that is, 10% below what wholesalers pay for 
drugs when they purchase them direct from the manufacturer 
for resale to retailers. The generic OBRA '90 rebate 
probably served as incentive to manufacturers of generic 
drugs to restructure their pricing strategies. Severe 
discounts may have been curtailed or eliminated. Thus, 
respondents may have been influenced by the time of 
questionnaire response, June 1992. Having previously made 
what adjustments were possible, respondents might have been 
influenced to answer that their ability would be unaffected 
(future tense) as they answered the questionnaire in June 
1992, meaning, in fact, since they had adjusted in calendar 
1991 there would be no additional effect. This could have 
been el i minated if different verb tense had been used in the 
question: . "My company's ability to extend special 
pricing to competitive procurement groups has been . II 
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This might have eliminated any possible confusion for those 
responding. 
Those who felt their ability to extend special pricing 
would be decreased or greatly decreased comprised 50% of the 
responses. These responses may be understated by the 
inclusions of those companies who charge all buyers the same 
price as discussed in the previous question. As 
hypothesized, a forced discount to below wholesale prices 
for Medicaid customers plus the potential for being forced 
to supply at the "best price" level would disincline 
manufacturers from bidding at price levels below that 
obtained for Medicaid by calculating a fixed reduction from 
wholesale acquisition cost. Because if they did price below 
those levels, "best price" requirements would force them to 
match that price for Medicaid purchasers up to specified 
OBRA '90 limits. For example, if a generic manufacturer 
bids a drug to the State of Rhode Island at a price of 
$10.00, and the discounted price to Medicaid is $11.00, the 
manufacturer must then make an additional rebate to Medicaid 
of $1.00 for each unit. The extra $1.00 would be provided 
for each unit Medicaid purchased in each state. 
Importantly, while the State of Rhode Island may have 
purchased 100 units, Medicaid, in each state, may have 
purchased thousands and must receive a rebate for each unit. 
It is conceivable in this way that a manufacturer could end 
up rebating many more dollars to Medicaid than it profited 
by its sales to the State of Rhode Island, amounting to 
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actually losing money. Then it can be understood how 
important it would be for a manufacturer not to sell at too 
low a price to anyone but Medicaid. This, in effect, 
creates an artificial floor to bid prices because 
manufacturers who price below this floor risk triggering the 
"best price" mechanism of OBRA '90. Large discounts, 
historically available, cannot penetrate this floor without 
causing potentially serious financial repercussions for the 
manufacturer. 
The numbers claiming that their ability would be 
unaffected (45.8%) is greater than the number claiming no 
effect in question ten (33.3%). This may be a sign of an 
obvious phenomenon, that generic drugs are more price 
competitive than innovator drugs. For example, if 100 
manufacturers produce an acceptable quality Penicillin G and 
many competitive procurers poll many vendors, the winning 
price is likely to be very low as manufacturers compete in 
this example strictly by price. Theoretically, the low 
price vendor will win the bid. Wholesale prices will also 
be low due to market pressure as wholesalers may choose one, 
two or several vendors' Penicillin G to inventory, but not 
all. In this case wholesalers may exert downward pressure 
on prices just as effectively as a competitive procurer can 
with a bid instrument. (Recall that the AMP is defined by 
OBRA '90 as the price manufacturers charge wholesalers.) 
So, if one accepts this idea of a very narrow trading range, 
one can see that many multi-source products may have been in 
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no danger of breaking through that "best price" floor. 
Those responders who favor this view of the generic market 
could be more likely to respond in the not affected 
category. That the generic drugs are considered more price 
competitive can be seen in the OBRA '90 legislation which 
requires smaller rebates on generic drugs than on brand name 
innovator drugs (see Appendix 3). 
Those who felt their ability to extend special pricing 
would be decreased or greatly decreased comprised 50% of the 
survey. These responses were the expected majority. Forced 
discounts to below wholesale prices for Medicaid customers 
plus the potential for being forced to supply at the "best 
price" level should disincline manufacturers from bidding at 
price levels below that obtained for Medicaid. It was 
reasoned that many respondents aware of this potential would 
say that their ability to price (low) to competitive 
procurement would be decreased in some degree. The 
existence of this "price floor" will affect the success of 
competitive bid acquisitions in achieving low prices for 
pharmaceuticals. 
Question #12: Base = 24 
12. OBRA '90 specifies that "single contract awards" and 
"exempt awards" will not affect Medicaid rebate 
calculations. Assume a bid group can qualify their 
acquisitions as such. How likely is the group to obtain 
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ANS: # # ( % ) # ( % ) 
( 1) 3 ( 20) 1 ( 25) 
( 2 ) 2 (13.3) 1 ( 25) 
( 3) 8 (53.3) 1 (25) 
( 4 ) 0 1 ( 25) 
( 5 ) 1 ( 6 . 7 ) 0 







# ( % ) # ( % ) 
0 4 ( 16. 7) 
0 3 (12.5) 
3 ( 60) 12 (50) 
2 (40) 3 (12.5) 
0 1 ( 4 . 2) 
The question is tested with a Chi Square "goodness of 
· fit" test. The hypotheses tested are: 
Null Hypothesis: the responses are a random 
distr i bution. 
Alternate Hypothesis: the responses exhibit a 
statistically significant preference. 
Chi Square = Sigma (O-E) 2 /E 
The critical value of Chi Square at a 5% significance 
level and degrees of freedom equal to 4 is 9.488. The value 
of the test statistic calculated as above with n = 23 and 
(probability) p = 0.2 is 15.89. 
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Since the value of the test statistic falls in the rejection 
region (Chi > 9.488) and the null is rejected. The 
alternate is accepted; the results are statistically 
significant. 
More than one quarter (29 . 2%) of respondents thought it 
likely or somewhat likely that a bid group's acquisition, if 
qualified as exempt, would result in lower prices. This was 
a lower number than the media reports led one to suspect 
would answer in the affirmative. As hypothesis H6G states: 
- --That if a competitive procurement group's 
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt award" 
and, therefore, not a factor to be considered in the 
Medicaid "best price" rebate calculations, this will 
result in lower prices being offered. 
Discussion: 
The reasons why an exempt bid might win lower prices 
are as discussed earlier, recall the "best price" and price 
floor mechanisms. Before OBRA '90, manufacturers could 
price their pharmaceuticals at whatever (low) level they 
chose. If manufacturers really wanted to win a particular 
bid, for example, for reasons of prestige or market 
penetration in a particular area, or any reason, prices even 
below cost could be offered. Now OBRA '90 mandates that 
Medicaid shall have access to rebates calculated from the 
Average Manufacturers Price (AMP) or, if lower, shall 
receive the manufacturers "best price" which OBRA defines 
as: 
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" . The lowest price aid by any purchaser (exclusive 
of depot prices and single award contract prices as 
defined by any federal agency) . exclusive of 
nominal pr ices . " 
The "best price" scenario is well illustrated by 
48 Myers: 
"Consider a company that sells a product at an average 
manufacturer's price (AMP) of $50.00, but gives a 
special price to $5.00 (best price) to hospitals or 
other preferred buyers. Assume these prices do not 
change through 1993. In 1991 this firm will have to 
provide Medicaid a rebate of $12.50 per unit (25% of 
AMP); in 1992 the rebate will increase to $25.00 (50% 
of AMP). . After 1992, however, the cap is 
removed, and beginning in 1993 the rebate would be 
$45.00 per unit. . To avoid paying such a high 
rebate a firm may try to raise its prices in the 
preferred markets. The closer the best price in the 
preferred markets comes to the AMP, the lower the 
firm's rebate . . (to Medicaid) will be." 
Because the manufacturer offered this hospital (example 
above) a lower price than the AMP, OBRA '90 mandates that an 
extra rebate must be made to each state Medicaid agency as 
calculated above. 
On the other hand, the 29.2% of respondents who thought 
exempt bids would receive lower prices compares well to 
question seven regarding the Veterans Administration 
pricing. There, 50% of respondents said the Veterans 
Administration received their lowest price for 
pharmaceuticals. Veterans pricing is specifically exempted 
from the "best price" mechanism. Selection of the Veterans 
Administration in question number seven shows it is possible 
for one purchaser to receive a lower price than other market 
segments. Most of those other segments listed in question 
number seven do not have the "best price" exemption. 
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Admittedly, it does not prove that the reason the Veterans 
Administration obtained the lowest prices was because of the 
"best price" exemption. Literature quoted earlier leads one 
to believe that the combination of competition and the low 
cost of the depot system of distribution have been the 
historic reasons the Veterans Administration has secured low 
cost. Nevertheless, what the literature and the 
questionnaire responses do show is that manufacturers can 
continue to offer the VA low prices by virtue of its 
exemption without incurring rebate penalties under OBRA 
'90's "best price" provisions. 
Some bias is included in this question by surveying 
those respondents who either do not participate in the 
Medicaid rebates or who indicated that they charge all 
buyers the same price. These responders would be expected 
to answer that exemption would not affect their bid prices. 
Another issue might have been the perceived threat of 
the question. Respondents might have worried that bid 
groups might incorrectly identify themselves as exempt. 
Then having given those groups lower prices, perhaps depot 
pricing, the company would be obligated to give extra 
rebates to Medicaid because of the "best price" mechanism. 
Examining responses further, one notices the large 
number of "unsure" answers. A total of 50% answered that 
they were unsure that an exempt bid would result in lower 
prices. Those respondents who selected unsure may have done 
so, in part, because they knew there is no specific method 
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in the OBRA '90 regulations that explained how an 
organization other than a federal agency may qualify itself 
as "exempt" and, therefore, not affecting the Medicaid 
rebate calculations. 
Positive responses would have been higher than 29.2% 
and unsure responses fewer if the question could have used 
specific OBRA '90 language that qualified a group as exempt 
in question twelve such as: "assume a bid group qualifies 
as exempt as established by paragraph 15 . II Since 
exempt is undefined, many might have selected "unsure" 
because they felt more information was needed. They might 
have been concerned that such exempt acquisition by 
non-Federal purchasers was impossible. 
Another possible factor is that the question asks how 
likely respondent's company is to offer lower pricing. 
Responders may have felt that elimination of the "best 
price" mechanism as a factor would potentially allow lower 
prices; however, they may have been unsure their company 
would lower its prices regardless. 
Finally, perhaps such a theoretical question was not 
answerable without a full understanding of corporate 
position on the matter and corporate position on such 
matters may not exist. Responders may have considered 
themselves too low on the corporate ladder to speak on 
policy issues not yet formed. 
In summary, among those who expressed an opinion, as 
opposed to "unsure", responses were almost 3:1 that 
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exemption would allow lower prices (29.2% vs. 8.4%). Only 
29.2% of respondents support the hypothesis that exemption 
from the "best price" mechanism would result in lower bid 
acquisition prices for pharmaceuticals. 
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CONCLUSION 
A majority of respondents on the Rhode Island 
pharmaceutical bid list are and will continue to be 
participants in the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
Because of the nature of the population sampled, a list of 
bidders in the State of Rhode Island, readers are cautioned 
that the researcher cannot infer that these conclusions are 
valid on a national basis. Any extrapolations to the 
national scene are solely at the discretion of the reader. 
Literature surveyed indicates that it is in these vendors' 
self-interest to participate because participation allows 
eligibility of full product line to Medicaid coverage. The 
Medicaid market accounts for 10% of the dollar volume spent 
on prescription drugs in the United States. Participation 
in the rebates, while providing substantial savings to 
Medicaid's drug bill, is expected to result in the loss of 
at least some gross profit to a majority of respondents. 
When respondents were asked how such a loss in gross prof it 
would be replaced, responses varied widely. Public 
statements of manufacturer spokespersons to the contrary, 
the majority of respondents did not predict that loss of 
gross profit would result in a reduction of research 
expenditure; however, it was not possible to test these 
responses for statistical significance. Unfortunately, the 
study was not able to determine pre-OBRA '90 research 
activity because of space and content considerations, that 
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is, to be effective the questionnaire could not be overly 
long. Paramount design considerations were for a brief, 
easy, nonthreatening questionnaire to maximize response. 
Therefore, requests for information that could be considered 
confidential or sensitive were avoided. Therefore, the data 
are not sufficient to allow stratifying respondents 
according to extent of pre-OBRA '90 research activity. 
Regarding drug bid acquisition effects, findings 
support the hypothesis that OBRA '90 rebates will result in 
higher prices to those buyers other than Medicaid. Buyers 
employing competitive acquisitions, sometimes referred to as 
·"preferred" buyers, will probably find that their customary 
large discounts have been curtailed as a side effect of OBRA 
'90's best price mechanism. Pricing will still vary 
customer by customer as the majority of respondents did not 
predict any incentive to convert to uniform pricing. In 
addition, most respondents said that buyers will not be 
provided with published best prices by their company. This 
would have been useful information for pharmaceutical buyers 
to gauge the success of their competitive acquisitions. 
Hence, buyers with no uniform pricing and no published 
knowledge of "best price," will still labor to conduct 
competitive bids, but results (low prices) may be less 
rewarding than before OBRA '90. This will likely be the 
result of two factors: one, the upward pressure on product 
line prices in general, caused by an estimated $4.2 billion 
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dollars of Medicaid rebates over five years, and two, the 
effect of the OBRA best price mechanism which will tend to 
limit previously available deep discounts. 
Recently, certain purchasers who find themselves 
disadvantaged by the OBRA '90 best price mechanism are 
requesting its repeal and some are seeking exemption from 
the best price calculations in the hope of obtaining better 
pricing. An amendment to a separate Veterans Administration 
law engineered by Senator Mikulski (D-MD): 
" . Has exempted V A (Veterans Administration) drug 
discounts for six months from use in calculating 
Medicaid "best price" available rebates. The intent of 
the amendment was to encourage manufacturers to 
increase discounts to V A by t~§ing V A pricing out of 
the Medicaid rebate equation.'' (Note: these would 
be acquisitions other than the depot purchases which 
are already exempt, see reference to FSS below.) 
And VA Secretary Anthony Principi said he is: 
" . Pleased with the compromise that would provide a 
permanent exemption of the FSS (Federal Suppl~0 Schedule) from best price calculations . . " 
Also, in response to Congressional efforts by certain groups 
to eliminate the best price mechanism of OBRA '90: 
"Chairman Henry D. Waxman ... (House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment) 
. has introduced an amendment that would retain the 
current 'best price' method of calculating rebates from 
drug manufacturers to state Medicaid programs through 
fiscal year 1994, and exclude certain purchasers, 
including the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and 
the Indian HeaSth Service, from the calculation of 
'best price'." 
The possibility (question number twelve) of using an 
exempt status from best price calculations to achieve lower 
bid prices was also explored. Results were inconclusive at 
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the time of questionnaire response with the majority of 
respondents saying they were unsure that exemption from best 
price calculations would result in lower prices. However, 
those respondents expressing an opinion numbered 
approximately 3:1 in the affirmative that exempt bids would 
achieve lower prices by reason of their exempt status. 
While support for the hypothesis that exemption from best 
price mechanisms would lower bid prices was inconclusive, 
the actions of various drug procurement groups to remove 
themselves from the mechanism do support this hypothesis. 
As mentioned above, some preferred purchasers and some 
departments of the Federal government are actively seeking 
legislative relief from the OBRA '90 best price side effects 
in an effort to lower their drug acquisition cost. 
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( APPENDIX ONE 
Definitions: 
"Best Price": . "the lowest price paid by any purchaser 
(exclusive of depot prices and single award contract prices 
as defined by any federal agency) . exclusive of nominal 
prices . " 
"Average Manufacturers Price: ("AMP " ): " . the average 
price paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the 
retail class of trade . " 
Generic Drug: Multi-source drugs whose exclusive patent 
rights have expired and with proper application to the FDA 
may be made by various pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Also called "non-innovator multiple source drugs". 
Generic Rebate Plan: For 1991 to 1993 the rebate is 10 %; 
for 1994 and future years the rebate will be 11%. 
Innovator Drug: A drug whose exclusive patent rights have 
not expired. Patent holder has rights to exclusive 
manufacturer but may cross license other firms to 
manufacture. 
OBRA, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act: Provisions of 
this legislation require manufacturers to rebate certain 
portions of the purchase price of pharmaceuticals to the 
Medicaid Program in each state. Sometimes referred to as 
the Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirements. 
CPI-U: Consumer Price Index-all urban consumers, used to 
calculate the rate of inflation for drug prices to see if an 
additional rebate is required. 
Additional Rebate: An extra rebate that is calculated using 
CPI-U, on a drug-by-drug basis, to recover the increase in 
average manufacturers prices over the rate of inflation, 
with October 1, 1990, used as a baseline for AMP. 
"Exempt Award": For the purposes of this research an 
"exempt award" is an hypothetical price agreement between a 
manufacturer and a purchaser in which the price quoted will 
not affect the "best price to any purchaser" as defined by 
OBRA '90. Such an award will not cause the manufacturer to 
extend similar pricing to Medicaid or be used in any AMP 
calculations. 
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( APPENDIX TWO 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Supplied Under State Medical 
Assistance Programs: 1 
"Medicaid (Title XIX of the federal Social Security 
Act) is a program of national health assistance, funded 
by the federal government and the states, for 
low-income individuals and families who are aged, blind 
or disableq, or members of families with dependent 
children." 
Medicaid is separate and distinct from Medicare, which 
is a program of medical assistance for the elderly and 
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). 
Each state and some territories operate Medicaid 
programs according to their own rules within a broad 
framework of Federal guidelines. 
Medicaid was enacted in the Social Security Amendments 
of 1965, it replaced a system of categorical public 
. assistance that allowed the federal government to share with 
the states the cost of maintaining certain groups and 
providing for their medical treatment. Because the need for 
increased Medical services created the need for increased 
funding, Medicaid was created and amended to provide grants 
to states to enable states to provide the necessary medical 
1Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance 
Programs, Fowler, Richard W., ed., National Pharmaceutical 
Council, Reston, VA 22091 (September 1991), pp. 1-25. 
2 Ibid., pp. 1-25. 
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assistance and the categorical public assistance programs 
were ended. 
Medicaid is available to all persons who are receiving 
payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program and, with a few exceptions, to the aged, blind and 
disabled who receive Supplemental Security Income: 
Eligibility standards must conform with Federal 
guidelines. 
Payment for services is made directly to health care 
providers by the state administering agency or its 
representatives. 
States provide their own quality control system 
following Federal guidelines. 
In 1990, Medicaid accounted for $64.8 billion in 
Federal and state expenditures for medical services. 
Federal regulations describe a broad outline within which 
states may tailor their own programs. Funding is shared 
between states and the Federal government. The Federal 
government matches state health care provider reimbursements 
at a rate of between 50% and 83% depending on the state's 
per capita income. In Rhode Island the Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage {FMAP) is 53.29%. 
Federal law requires that all persons who qualify for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children {AFDC) and most 
persons who qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
also receive Medicaid coverage. Certain basic services are 
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required to be provided under the Medicaid coverage while 
others are included at the state's option. States may 
expand coverage to additional groups of people and expand 
the range of services offered. 
Services Provided Under Medicaid: 
1. Professional Services 
2 . Nursing Care Services 
3. Nursing Home Services 
4 . Hospital and Clinic Services 
5 . Drugs, Supplies and Equipment 
6 . Special Services and Therapy 
7 . Institutional Care 
8. Other 
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement After OBRA 1990: 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 
incorporated various measures to reduce expenditures for 
prescription drug products provided to Medicaid patients. 
Public Law 101-508 resulted from the OBRA 1990 and was 
enacted on November 5, 1990. Accordingly, effective January 
1, 1991, pharmaceutical manufacturers must agree to provide 
rebates to all state Medicaid agencies in order for their 
products to be eligible for inclusion in Medicaid programs. 
(see OBRA rebate summary, Appendix 4). 
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( APPENDIX THREE 
SUMMARY OF OBRA '90 MANDATED MEDICAID REBATES! 
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, certain elements of previously submitted bills 
designed to reduce Federal and state outlays for 
prescription drug products provided to Medicaid outpatients 
were signed into law (Public Law 101-508). Accordingly, 
effective January 1991, in prder for a manufacturer's drug 
product line to be eligible for any coverage under Medicaid, 
the manufacturer must provide rebates to all state Medicaid 
programs. 
REBATE TERMS FOR SOLE SOURCE AND INNOVATOR MULTI-SOURCE 
PRODUCTS: 
Sole source and innovator multi-source products 
manufacturers are to pay the following rebates to 
each state Medicaid program quarterly. 
1991: Whichever is greater, 12.5% of the average 
manufacturers price (AMP) or the difference between 
AMP and the best price, not to exceed 25%. That is, 
the amount of rebate is capped at 25% of the AMP. 
1992: The same as 1991, except the cap becomes 50%. 
The potential rebate is increased to 50% of the 
difference between the AMP and the "best price". 
1993: Whichever is greater, 15% of the AMP or the 
entire difference between AMP and the "best price", 
for 1993 there is no cap. 
1994: The same as 1993. 
1
william A. Zellmer, ed., "Summary of 1990 Medicaid 
Drug Rebate Legislation," American Journal of Hospital 
Pharmacy, Vol. 48 (January 1991): 114-117. 
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REBATE TERMS FOR GENERIC PRODUCTS: 
1991 to 1993: The rebate is 10% 
1994: The rebate is 11%. 
ADDITIONAL REBATE: 
Should a manufacturer raise drug prices more than the 
rate of inflation, an additional rebate must be 
provided to Medicaid to the extent the price rise 
exceeds the Consumer Price Index. 
1991 to 1993: Additional rebate is calculated for each 
product of a manufacturer. 
1994: The additional rebate is calculated on the basis 




Hl. That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode 
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated 
Medicaid rebate requirements. 
H2. That most manufacturers are participating in the 
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates. 
H3. That most manufacturers will continue to 
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one 
year). 
H4. That a majority of manufacturers will expect to 
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing 
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan. 
HS. That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA 
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will cause a reduction in 
funds available to support research. 
H6. That the following effects will occur in drug bid 
acquisitions: 
H6a: That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one 
segment of the pharmaceutical market will have the 
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence on 
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid. 
H6b: That all purchasers do not necessarily pay 
the same price for pharmaceuticals. 
H6c: That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers 
to receive the same price. 
H6d: That while a "best price" will be known and 
established in order to calculate the Medicaid 
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally 
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool 
or benchmark against which they might judge the 
success of their acquisitions. 
H6e: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
H6f: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers 
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs 
to competitive bid acquisitions. 
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H6g: That if a competitive procurement group's 
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt 
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be 
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate 






Director of Professional Relations 
Dear Colleague, 
11 Ridge Road 
North Scituate, RI 
Date ... 
02857 
I am writing to request your help. By surveying active 
bidders on the annual Pharmaceutical contracts for the State 
of Rhode Island, I hope to find what effect, if any, 
Federally mandated Medicaid rebates will have on the prices 
paid by the State of Rhode Island and other procurement 
groups. 
Until recently, I was the Medical Buyer for the State 
of Rhode Island and that assignment created my interest in 
this topic. Presently, I am a Master of Science Degree 
Candidate in the Pharmacy Administration Program at the 
University of Rhode Island, College of Pharmacy, and this 
work will be important to my degree research requirements. 
Enclosed is a brief questionnaire that will take but a 
few moments to complete and return in the stamped reply 
envelope. 
All replies are strictly confidential, there are no 
hidden identifiers and all answers will be used only in 
statistical tables. 
Because the sampling group is select, your response is 
very important to the success of this poll. Even if you 
feel that you are not the most qualified to answer the 
questions, your response is valuable because it will improve 
statistical accuracy and help to minimize sample bias. If 
you are still hesitant, please refer this survey to someone 
in your organization who will answer. 
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If you are interested in receiving a report on the 
findings of this research, simply write your name and 
address at the end of the questionnaire. Or, if you prefer, 
request the results of the survey in a separate letter. 
Either way, your confidentiality will be respected. 
Because this project must be closed soon, I would 
appreciate your prompt response. Thank you in advance for 
your kind assistance. 
Sincerely, 





11 Ridge Road 
North Scituate, RI 
Date . .. 
Recently we mailed you a questionnaire asking for your 
help in an important survey. 
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please 
consider this note a "Thank you" for your valuable help. 
If you have not had a chance to do so as yet, may we 
ask you to return the completed form now. Your 
participation is vital to the success of our study. 
Sincerely yours, 
William N. Bilotti, RPh. 
MS Candidate 
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( PHARMACEUTICAL PROCUREMENT SURVEY 
DEFINITION OF TERMS: 
"Best Price": ."The lowest price paid by any purchaser 
(exclusive of depot prices and single award contract prices 
as defined by any Federal agency) . exclusive of nominal 
prices . " 
"Average Manufacturers Price", ("AMP"): . "The average 
price paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the 
retail class of trade . " 
Generic Drug: Multi-source drugs whose exclusive patent 
rights have expired and with proper application to the FDA 
may be made by various pharmaceutical manufacturers. Also 
called "non-innovator multiple source drugs". 
Generic Rebate Plan: For 1991 to 1993 the rebate is 10%; 
for 1994 and future years the rebate will be 11%. 
OBRA, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act: Provisions of this 
legislation require manufacturers to rebate certain portions 
of the purchase price of pharmaceuticals to the Medicaid 
Program. sometimes referred to as the Medicaid Prudent 
Purchaser Requirements. 
Survey Questions: 
1. Are you familiar with the Medicaid rebate requirements 
mandated by the OBRA '90, sometimes referred to as the 
Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirements? 
1. ( ) yes 2. ( ) no 3. ( ) not sure 
2. Does your company participate in the Medicaid rebate 
program? 
3 . 
1. ( ) yes 2. ( ) no 3. ) not sure 
How likely is your company to begin 
participation within one year? 
1. ( )very likely 4. 
2 . ( ) likely 5 . 




4. What effect, if any, do you think the Medicaid rebates 
will have on the Gross Profit margin of your company's 
pharmaceutical line? 
1. ( )strong increase 
2. ( )some increase 





If you answered 1, 2 or 3, please go to question number 6. 
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5. Which of these strategies is your company most likely 
to employ, other than price increases, to recover any 
profit margins that might be reduced by supplying 
rebates to State Medicaid programs? 
1. ( )cut advertising 4. ( )reduce research 
2. ( )expand markets expenditure 
3. ( ) cut mfr. costs 5. ) other 
6. Some purchasers believe that mandated discounts to 
Medicaid have exerted upward pressure on the prices of 
pharmaceuticals available to the public through 
channels other than Medicaid; what is your opinion? 
1. ( )strongly agree 4. ( )disagree 
2. ( )agree 5. ( )disagree strongly 
3. ( ) no opinion 
7. Which of the following drug purchasers, in general, 
currently receives your lowest price for your single 
and/or multiple source innovator drugs? (check one) 
1. ( )Medicaid 6. )Veterans Administration 
2. ( ) hospital 7. ) chain pharmacy 
3. ( ) Ind. pharmacy 8. ) wholesaler 
4. ( ) State Govt. 9. ) none of these 
5. ( )buying group 10. )all buyers/same price--
--Go To Question #9. 
8. If you did not ch~ck "same price", how likely do you 
think that the OBRA legislation will provide an 
incentive to your company to offer the same price to 
all these purchasers? 
l. ( ) very likely 4. ) unlikely 
2. ( ) likely 5. )very unlikely 
3. ( ) not sure 
9. As the legislation requires a 12.5% discount from AMP 
or a "manufacturers best price", how likely is your 
company to publish these Medicaid prices, for example, 
in the company catalog, the REDBOOK, etc., so that 
other groups may use them as a reference? 
1. ( ) very likely 4. ( ) unlikely 
2. ( )somewhat likely 5. ( )very unlikely 
3. ( ) not sure 
***Many segments of the pharmaceutical market practice 
competitive procurement, i.e., sealed buds, contract 
purchasing, buying groups and so forth. The following 
questions are designed to assess how this legislation will 
impact the prices your company will offer to these groups. 
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10. Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability 
to extend special pricing to competitive procurement 
groups for single and/or multi-sourced innovator drugs 
will be ... 
1. ( ) greatly increased 4. ) decreased 
2. ( ) increased 5. ) greatly decreased 
3. ( )not affected 
11. Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability 
to extend special pricing to competitive procurement 
groups for generic drugs (multi-sourced, non-innovator) 
will be ... 
1. ( ) greatly increased 4. ) decreased 
2. ( ) increased 5. ) greatly decreased 
3. ( )not affected 
12. OBRA specifies that "single contract awards" and 
"exempt awards" will be affect Medicaid rebate 
calculations. Assume a bid group can qualify their 
acquisitions as such. How likely is the group to 
obtain better pricing from your company if the prices 
you offer are exempt from these calculations? 
1. ( ) very likely 4. ( ) unlikely 
2. ( )somewhat likely 5. ( )very unlikely 
3. ( ) unsure 
Please tell me about your company: 
13. Is your company 
this time? 
1. ( ) yes 
2 . ( ) not sure 
a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals at 
3. ) no--Skip to 
Question #16. 
14. Do you manufacture prescription pharmaceuticals? 
1. ( ) yes 2. ( ) no 3. ( ) not sure 
15. Does your company manufacture only generic drugs at 
this time? 
1. ( ) yes 2. ( ) no 3. ( ) not sure 
16. Do you market any prescription drugs protected by 
exclusive patent--either by your own discovery and/or 
by license agreement? 
1. ( )yes 2. ( )no 3. ( )not sure 
Strictly optional: 
What is your job title? (e.g., vice president, 
supervisor, director, etc.): 
111 
If you would like a copy of the survey results as soon as 
available, fill in your name, company and address below. 
Or, you may ·request the results by sending a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope under separate cover. 
Please return the survey in the stamped envelope provided 
without delay. 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR COOPERATION. 
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